Inequality and democracy: The UK case in the last thirty years by Soci, Anna
1 
Anna Soci 
University of Bologna 
Inequality and Democracy 
The UK case in the last thirty years 
April 2012 
Paper prepared for  
the Italian Academy for Advanced Studies at Columbia University 
2 
Inequality and Democracy 
- The UK case in the last thirty years – 
1. Introduction 
2. Economics and Politics 
3. Theory (or Theoretical Linkages)  
 3.1  Economics and Income Inequality 
 3.2  Inequality and Democracy 
4. A focus on Inequality 
 4.1      Defining Economic Inequality  
 4.2     Measuring Economic Inequality 
5. Stylized Facts 
6. Case-Study and Work-Plan   
7. The Empirical Approach 
7.1  First Stage: to Inequality 
7.2      Second Stage: from Inequality to Democracy 
7.3      A Third Stage? 




1. Introduction (*) 
At the very beginning of this research I read a fascinating book – considered a popular non-
academic book, though written by the two academics Richard Wilkinson and Kate Pickett – 
titled The spirit level: why equality is better for everyone.  
In this work Wilkinson and Pickett consider the income distribution in 23 rich countries 
(U.S. included) and plot the ratio between the income received by the top 20% of the 
population to that received by the bottom 20% - as a measure of inequality - against the Index 
of health and social problems built on the UN Development Program data (averaged for the 
reporting period 2003-2006) for the same countries. This index – like the well known Human 
Development Index (HDI) – is a simple average of the data for the following social 
phenomenon: level of trust, mental illness (no data for Denmark), life expectancy, infant 
mortality, obesity, children educational performance (no data for UK), teenage birth, homicides, 
imprisonment rates, social mobility. Without entering into the details, the main and robust 
message coming out from the book is that among the 23 rich countries the more unequal ones 
do worse according to almost every quality of life indicator. The U.S. – the most unequal 
country in the sample – is the most striking example of that, followed by Portugal and the UK 
(both places where the gap between rich and poor is relatively large), whilst the Scandinavian 
countries invariably rank last. The message is clear: social problems were caused by material life 
conditions the more affluent countries should have performed better than the less affluent (still 
in the same basket of rich countries). Instead, the evidence suggests that it is the relative 
position within a society to matter the most: where income differences are bigger, social 
distances are bigger and social stratification more remarkable.  
 
(*) This work would not have been possible without the collaboration of  Anna Maccagnan and 
Daniela Mantovani, who collected the data and made the computer-job. Their precious presence 




To argue that whether there is an overall better chance of getting fat or dying young if you 
live in an unequal society does not mean that almost everyone is going to benefit from 
increased equality sounds methodologically correct,1 in so far as that depends on whether the 
disadvantages of inequality are distributed across the social scale, or whether they cluster at 
the bottom. However, it is undeniable that the book takes the problem of social unease 
connected to the overall richness of a country to the surface. The problem we should think 
about – which is one of the themes of my research – is what those people frustrated, mentally 
disturbed, with short life expectancy, likely to die in their infancy, obese, with low education, 
likely parents when teenagers, probable killers, candidates to the jail, socially locked-in, what 
those poor, distressed, unhappy people are going to do in their connection with the wealthy 
social democratic environment they are in. One doesn’t have to believe in equality to be 
concerned about that, the concern already reached the most important media. On last March 
21st in the NYT Eduardo Porter wrote that “Once inequality becomes very acute, it breeds 
resentment and political instability, eroding the legitimacy of democratic institutions. It can 
produce political polarization and gridlock, splitting the political system between haves and 
have-nots, making it more difficult for governments to address imbalances and respond to 
brewing crises. That too can undermine economic growth, let alone democracy”. On March 28th 
in The Washington Post Harold Meyerson writes that “the consequences of this concentration of 
wealth and income extend beyond the purely economic. A middle class enduring prolonged 
stagnation isn’t likely to fund projects the nation needs to undertake—such as rebuilding our 
infrastructure or increasing teacher pay — or, ultimately, to retain its faith in the efficacy of 
democracy. The rise of super PACs, 2 the low rates of taxation on capital gains and hedge fund 
operators, the ability of the major banks to fend off reform — all testify to the power of a neo-
plutocracy beyond democratic control….. A nation where 93 percent of income growth goes to 
the top 1 percent is not a nation that will embark on great projects, or long command the 
allegiance of its people”. Last but not least, in the November 20th Financial Times Lawrence 
                                                          
1 D.  Runciman, (2009)  
2  Political Action Committee: groups organized for the support of politicians. 
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Summers titled his paper “We have to do better for inequality”, and shifted the attention for 
the first time from the mantra of growth and growing to the less honk concern of income 
distribution: “the extent of the change in income distribution is such that it is no longer true that 
the overall growth rate of the economy is the principal determinant of middle-class income 
growth – how the growth pie is distributed is at least as important. That most of the increase in 
inequality reflects gains for those at the very top at the expense of everyone else further belies 
the idea that simply strengthening the economy will reduce inequality”. In Italy, the journalist-
voice-from-America Federico Rampini wrote on the April 4th La Repubblica “I super-ricchi non 
esitano più ad intervenire direttamente come "azionisti" nelle scelte di governo. .... [Avremo] 
una "plutonomia": un sistema in cui i ricchi definiscono le leggi, scrivono le regole, dettano 
l'agenda ai leader del mondo....” A list of the richest American families with a summary 
evaluation of their wealth follows in the article, and I am not going to report it here, but the 
message is clear: why should the richest not control the political power in order to keep or even 
augmenting their wealth?  
It is worthwhile remembering, as a final touch, the detailed tales about American politics 
and its tight connections to money and interest groups offered by the well known book by 
Hacker and Pierson, The winner-take-all-politics, and the debate associated to it.3  
2. Economics and Politics 
As you may not know, the term which designates nowadays my discipline – economics – has 
not always been this one. The founder fathers called it Political Economy, and it is only recently 
that it became Economics.  
Since economics is the discipline that studies allocation of resources, production, 
exchange, distribution, all things that imply social interaction, politics – the art of governing the 
“public” thing – immediately becomes a piece of this game. Thus, economics, at least at its 
macro-level, cannot be taken as a distinct subject from politics. This is precisely what our 
“classics” were doing: the trio Smith, Ricardo, and Marx, always wrote about Political Economy, 
                                                          
3
 J. S. Hacker and P. Pierson, (2010).   
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analyzing the interaction between the political and the economic sector. The replacement of 
the “embarrassing” label Political Economy with the more neutral Economics comes in two 
steps: first, William Jevons substitutes Theory to Principles in the 2nd edition of the Theory of 
political economy (saying that the term theory was more scientific than the term principles) and 
soon after (1890) Alfred Marshall retained Principles but changed Political Economy and 
entitled his famous book as Principles of Economics.  And the political side of the economic 
science gets out from the scene4. Let me report what Jevons writes on this change:  
 “Among minor alterations, I may mention the substitution for the name Political Economy of 
the single convenient term Economics. ……. This term, besides being more familiar and 
closely related to the old term, is perfectly analogous in form to Mathematics, Ethics, 
Æsthetics, and the names of various other branches of knowledge, and it has moreover the 
authority of usage from the time of Aristotle. Mr. Macleod is, so far as I know, the re-
introducer of the name in recent years, but it appears to have been adopted also by Mr. 
Alfred Marshall at Cambridge. It is thus to be hoped that Economics will become the 
recognized name of a science, which nearly a century ago was known to the French 
Economists as la science économique. Though employing the new name in the text, it was 
obviously undesirable to alter the title-page of the book”.5 
Recently, the reintroduction of politics – however in a way which political scientists look 
at suspiciously – has led to a new [meaningful] label:  Political Economics, as we will see below.  
Before this last evolution but still in recent times, the Public Choice field of economics picked up 
the inheritance of the early stage though in a different perspective. In the 1960s the idea of 
politicians and public officials not pursuing the good of the citizens and, on the contrary, 
striving for power started to become a regular assumption and a large number of analyses of 
politico-economic interactions based on the assumption of self-interested politicians and 
bureaucrats flourished6. The interaction between the economy and the polity (a polity is 
generally understood to mean a geographic area with a corresponding government) has been 
analyzed in various quantitative and empirical ways. The most widely used model of Public 
                                                          
4
 The very profound successive and definitive transformation of the discipline to a formalized corpus is 
documented by R. Weintraub, (2002). 
5 W. S. Jevons, (1879), Preface to the second edition, p.5 
6  See, for all, J. M. Buchanan and G. Tullock, (1962).  
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Choice based on the assumption of politicians maximizing their own utility is the ultra notorious 
Median Voter Model,7 whose most straightforward prediction is that income redistribution will 
be popular when the mean income is higher than the median income.8 In other words, it is 
assumed that each individual has a well defined preference on a combination of taxes and 
transfers, as a function of his income and wealth. In a majoritarian democratic system the 
selected combination will be the one preferred by the voter who stays exactly in the middle of 
the distribution. On a more general terms, since the median voter's distance from the average 
capital endowment in the economy will increase with wealth inequality, she would approve a 
tax rate that is higher the more unequal the distribution of wealth, which in turn would reduce 
investment and economic growth. Thus in a democracy we would expect higher inequality to 
be associated with lower growth. 
Since the median voter theorem is valid only in specific circumstances, the theory linked 
to it has not been supported empirically, not surprisingly, and has been gradually abandoned. 
Malign economists say that only political scientists keep using it.  
In the 1970s, the Political Business Cycles kind of models became prominent. Starting 
from the seminal contribution of Nordhaus9 in 1972, and running through the 1970s, 1980s, 
and 1990s,10 a variety of models with rational voters and opportunistic politicians appeared. I 
wish to stress the word “rational” – which is one of the epistemic pillars of the discipline – and 
the word “opportunistic”, which has no particular negative connotation, simply meaning that 
the politician is self interested, his interest being his re-election or more generally power. From 
the appearance of these contributions onwards, the new label of political economics came into 
fashion, something that many political scientist, at least in Italy and UK, do not like particularly 
both because the theoretical economic setting is the same as always, formalized and fully 
within the mainstream tradition, and because the political side of the plot is not properly 
                                                          
7  D. Black, (1948). For a review of the median voter literature see J. Londregan, (2006). 
8   A. H. Meltzer and S. F. Richard, (1981).  
9   W. D. Nordhaus, (1975). 
10 A. Alesina and H. Rosenthal (1995) is the contribution that later received most attention, but 
also T. Persson and G. Tabellini, (1990), (1999) and (2003, 2005) cannot be avoided to be quoted. 
8 
investigated, they say. In fact, these class of politico-economic models take the fundamental 
“rules of the game”, the constitutional or institutional setting which structures (human) political 
interaction in society, as exogenously giving. What they study is the interaction of political and 
economic activities by comparing the different outcomes of institutional rules. 
This problem of exogeneity versus endogeneity – which is one of the main problems in 
economics – remains unsolved. This is still, in each field or subfield of economics, a main issue, 
since in a social interaction context nothing can be taken as given, being everything the product 
of the action within the society. However, the researcher has to start from some point 
otherwise he reaches nowhere. He has to take something as exogenous, as given, especially if 
he is running the empirical test of a theory. This problem exists in other disciplines too but it is, 
as far as I know, less controversial or less influential, since hard sciences hinge upon human 
behavior less extensively than social sciences. Though the math allows, in principle, to handle 
everything as endogenous, this is seldom implementable in the models – usually small – that a 
single researcher or a small group of researchers generally are dealing with. The scholars 
engaging in “political economics” are obviously aware of the causality problem: institutions 
determine policy decisions and outcomes, but the latter also influence the institutions existing. 
However, to identify the causalities is difficult, and several attempts have remained 
unsatisfactory. Moreover, while recent contributions relating the economic and political sectors 
are impressive, they have to some extent remained within a specialist community of scholars. Their 
effect on general economics is not very large, but compared to the former self-contained economic 
theory that completely disregarded politics, much has been achieved. 
3. Theory (or Theoretical Linkages) 
3.1   Economics and Income Inequality  
There is no long tradition of systematic work on the concept of income inequality or on the size 
distribution of income. 
The theory of distribution – which has been for long time a (if not the) main subject in 
Economics (better, Political Economy at that time, as we have just seen) – was pointing at the 
9 
functional distribution of income. The concern of the classics was to explain and evaluate the 
way total production would distribute to the factors (of production): capital, labour and land. 
Profit, wage and rent. Full stop. “To determine the laws which regulate this distribution is the 
principal problem in Political Economy”.11 From the second half of 18th century class was a 
main concept, and remained such until the neo-classical or marginalist revolution, which we 
can date around the late 19th/early 20th century. The term class disappeared. The more 
neutral term group did not, but the concept itself of group did, giving place to that of the 
representative agent. However, the focus was still on the functional distribution of income 
within a theory that was explaining it through the concept of (marginal) productivity. And since 
the productivity is the meter for the reward, the earnings cannot be equal because productivity 
is not equal across people.  
Economic equality topic was never really central to the concerns of the profession. 
Economists preferred to focus on the way to improve the conditions of the people in the 
bottom part of the income distribution either theorizing on the employment conditions and on 
promoting growth or, surprisingly but not that much perhaps, sometimes arguing that a more 
egalitarian distribution might be detrimental to the production through its effects on savings. If 
a society has less rich people and less poor people, it has also less savings, since rich save and 
poor do not save. Less savings means less investment, and less production. It was Keynes who 
(first?) said that savings is a vice and not a virtue (in the short run. “And in the long run, we are 
all dead”, as one of the most quoted sentences of his tells). He advocated the importance of a 
reduced savings in favour of an increased consumption, as the main method to augment 
production in an economy working below capacity. Thus, an income-turn towards equality 
results (prospectively) in an increased total income.  
The reasoning above applies to developed economies since in developing countries the 
main problem is not a lack of (aggregate) demand. The main problem there is a lack of 
productive capacity. So, the prime concern must be about investment instead of consumption 
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(and savings, again, but not only savings since it is well known that savings must be 
intermediated by an efficient financial market in order to become investment). However, it was 
only after WWII that developing countries started becoming an issue and the problems related 
to their extreme poverty became visible and generated attention and concern in the whole 
society. Notwithstanding that, the (sadly right) theory that moving towards more equal 
distribution of income would not lead to any economic growth still kept the issue of the 
personal income distribution out of the economists’ sight. Only very recently the interest 
evolved into the personal distribution of incomes - the distribution among persons - and one of 
the reasons for that happening is simply the fact that developed advanced-economy countries 
are now experimenting inequality. In the 21st century prolonged unemployment, wage 
dispersion, ever increasing accumulation of wealth, extreme richness co-existing with very low 
incomes, were the main factors that let personal distribution of income start becoming an 
issue. The distribution of factors is still relevant but as a means to understanding the personal 
distribution, in a world where capital takes the form not only of real, material assets, but also of 
human capital (self-investment in education and training) and people cannot be identified 
anymore by a single source of incomes being the coexistence of wage, interest income, and 
rent, quite possible. 
Given that, do we have a theory of personal income distribution? “No unified theory of 
personal income distribution exists; instead the literature offers a series of building blocks 
which provide parts of an explanation”.12 Before turning to some elucidation of this statement 
let me briefly review what theory has offered to the income distribution field until the recent 
resurgence of interest. 
1.   Pareto’s α  
Pareto is considered the beginner of studies in income distribution. In his Cours 
d'économie politique he examines fiscal data for England, Prussia, Saxony, the Swiss canton of 
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Vaud, and a sample of Italian municipalities as well as the cities of Basel in Switzerland and 
Augsburg in Germany in the XV century, and he founds that the income distribution can be 
approximated by  
NX = A/X
α 
where NX  is the number of individuals with income equal to, or greater than X; and A, α, are 
constants. X belongs to an interval [h,∞] where h is the greater than 0 initial value of the 
empirical distribution, and both A and α are positive. The graphic representation is a decreasing 
hyperbola, and the α was interpreted by Pareto as an inequality measure since it represents 
how much the proportion of people with an income equal to or greater than a certain level 
varies (specifically, decreases) with income. This parameter appeared to be remarkably 
constant over time and space, with a value always within the range from 1.5 to 1.7. Thus, 
Pareto could comment: “L’inégalité de la répartition des revenues parâit donc dépandre 
beaucoup plus de la nature même des hommes que de l’organisation économique de la société. 
Des profondes modifications de cette organisation pourraient  bien n’avoir que peu d’influence 
pour modifier la loi de la répartition des revenues.13 [The inequality in the distribution of 
incomes seems therefore to depend much more on the human nature itself than on the 
economic organization of the society. It could well be the case that deep modifications of this 
organization had but than little impact on the law that governs the distribution of incomes]14. 
 The Pareto formula is generally presented in a linear version – as Pareto himself did in his 
book – as  
log NX = A – α log X 
A vivid debate followed this “discovery” – the story is long and goes beyond the aim of 
this paper – until 1939, when Bresciani-Turroni published on Econometrica an article where he 
kindly thanked Pareto for his meaningful insights on the income distribution issue suggesting at 
the same time that data did not always support “his α”. In Bresciani-Turroni’s words: “Pareto's 
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law is but an "empirical" and not a rational law of the distribution of incomes. Pareto did not 
attribute any importance to this distinction, which was stressed by Edgeworth in his controversy 
with Pareto [p. 130] …Pareto's conclusions as to the relation between the average income and 
the degree of inequality might not be accepted; yet he has drawn attention to a fundamental 
problem of economic policy [p. 132]…Other more appropriate indexes of inequality have been 
elaborated. Yet Pareto conceived for the first time the idea of measuring the inequality in the 
distribution of incomes” [ibidem].15 It is nowadays widely recognized that the functional form 
proposed by Pareto to describe the shape of income distribution is however able to model its 
upper tail, the richest portion.   
The Pareto’s α story might help explaining the absence of theorization about income 
distribution, together with the different concern of economics at that time: after all, Pareto 
offered a theory, and a lot of effort was then devoted to providing her with a statistical 
measure.    
2.  Kuznets’ inverted U 
Work on the distribution of income by size is very recent dating back to Kuznets’s 1953 
seminal work16 and his foremost quoted 1955 article.17 Kuznets looks at market-income for the 
United States, England and Germany on a family rather than an individual basis: two big 
differences with respect to Pareto: a difference in the data typology – market- instead of fiscal-
data – and in the recipient unity. “A scant sample, but at least a starting point for some 
inferences concerning long-term changes in the presently developed countries”.18 Kuznets 
interest was on the relationship between income distribution and the development of a 
country, and his conjecture was that inequality would increase with income at early stages of 
development and decrease at higher levels of income – after a period of stability – due to two 
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16 S. Kuznets, (1953).  
17 S. Kuznets, (1955). The article is his presidential address delivered actually on December 29,  1954, at 
the 67th Annual Meeting of the American Economic Association 
18 S. Kuznets, cit., p. 4, italics added.  
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different reasons. The first part of the hypothesis relies on inequality being relatively less when 
most people are in the traditional sector and going up when society develops. The explanation is 
based on a classical dualism between sectors: average incomes in the traditional (agricultural) 
sector are lower than in the modern (industrial) one, and overall differences persist when the 
process of transmigration from the backward sector to the advanced one has ended up due to 
the diversification of jobs in the industry. As development goes on inequality goes down along 
with the State presence and action in smoothing it down, in a role that belongs to advanced 
societies. In fact, as industrialization proceeds governments start taking a more active role in 
redistribution, which is one reason why inequality declines with development. Development is supposed 
to increase redistribution because it transforms a dispersed agrarian workforce into a more clustered 
workforce who can readily be organized, and it is associated with greater political sensitiveness. Thus, 
plotting an inequality index against per capita GDP originates an “inverted U” shaped curve. In 
the last part of this 1955 paper Kuznets devotes one paragraph to the differences between 
developed and underdeveloped countries, and he conjectures that “the secular income 
structure is somewhat more unequal in underdeveloped countries than in the more 
advanced”.19 Thus, Kuznets’s “inverted U” can be represented also in a multi-country space, 
where countries are captured on a different point in time along their development path.20 
Worthwhile remembering, in Kuznets’ words, that "in concluding this paper..……I am acutely 
conscious of the meagerness of reliable information presented. The paper is perhaps 5% 
empirical information and 95% speculation, some of it possibly tainted by wishful thinking".21 In 
an ex-post perspective, Kuznets inverse U did received enough validation until the 1970s 
experience, but is not supported any longer by data, and it is not invoked almost anymore as a 
theory for inequality.  
What after that? Very little. First and foremost, “no unified theory of income distribution 
exists; instead the literature offers a series of building blocks which provide part of the 
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20  E. L. Glaeser, (2005).    
21  S. Kuznets, cit., p. 26 
14 
explanation”22 where the lack of a unified theory may also be due to the relative novelty of the 
phenomenon of income inequality in western rich economies, as previously recalled, in addition 
to its complexity .    
The body of research on inequality starting from the second half of the 1970s was 
primarily concerned with data, concepts and measures clarification, and temporal trends 
detection. Probably for these features “the linkage between theory and empirics has 
sometimes been looser than in some other areas of economics, with a tendency for empirical 
research to prioritize careful treatment of the available data”.23 
As it is reported in a 2006 paper by Atkinson and Brandolini,24 the macro-econometric 
literature concerning the determinants of income inequality - and not the relationship between 
income inequality and something else, typically growth - is fairly young (and scanty). Some 
literature started to appear in the late 1980s, when the phenomenon of rising inequality began 
to take place. The oldest paper – according to the authors – dates back to 1986 and the next 
one is in the middle of the 1990s. All are based on a panel of countries - each having its own 
time span of data - instead of on a single country through time. As far as I know, and as 
Atkinson himself is pointing out, there are no econometric works on the determinants of 
personal income distribution following directly from a theoretically founded model, reflecting 
both the low interest economists have in inequality, as already recalled, and a lack of a 
comprehensive theory to work with, already mentioned as well.  
What it is generally told is that the increased competition from newly industrialising 
countries (NIC) and the technical change occurred in the last decades operated - separately or 
in conjunctions – to a shift of the demand away from unskilled- towards skilled-labour. The 
reduced demand for less skilled labour together with the relative supplies of the two kinds of 
workers fixed in the short run in a free labour market would raise the premium for skilled 
workers and would imply a decline in the relative wage of unskilled workers, thus provoking 
                                                          
22 A. B. Atkinson and F. Bourguignon,  (2001), p.7267. 
23 W. Salverda, B. Nolan, and T. M. Smeeding, (2009), “Introduction”, p.10. 
24 A. B. Atkinson and A. Brandolini (2006). 
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substantial wage dispersion (the US case). Whether unemployment benefits and/or minimum 
wages would place a floor (meaning that the relative wage of the unskilled workers cannot fall), 
the demand shift will result in a greater unemployment (the Europe case).  
What happens in the top part of income distribution – the top-incomes case – is unclear, 
though our main concern should be on that portion since the main component of the current 
inequality originates from there (as we will see in the next section). In order to understand 
what is going on nowadays in advanced economies we should investigate what happens to the 
top percentile and within the top percentile group. The skill bias explanation has little to say 
directly about why the top percentile has increased relative to the top decile, and the impact of 
technical change in replacing routine manual jobs only indirectly affects top earners. Factors 
such as globalisation and technological change are likely to operate also via the remuneration 
of the executives in a hierarchical structure or via the rents earned by the “superstars”. Again 
hinging on Atkinson, some – very few actually – models exist that might be useful, and, 
unfortunately, they do not seem easily testable.25 Moreover, in the top part of the distribution 
there are both labour and capital incomes, and capital incomes historically accounted for the 
bulk of top incomes. As Piketty (2001) has demonstrated for France,26 the composition of 
income changes radically within the top 10 percent: for those in the “first” 5 percent, earnings 
(in 1998 in France) accounted for 90 percent of their income; for those in the top 0.01 percent, 
capital income accounted for over 60 percent of total income. [On the contrary, in the U.S. the 
composition of the 0.01% “has changed considerably between 1960 and 2000. Salary income 
has been driving up top-incomes and has now become the main source of income at the very 
top”.27 This brings us to theories concerned with the accumulation of capital. Do we have a 
testable theory for the evolution of this component? No. What we have is something that, 
according to Atkinson - who is one of the few tackling this problem theoretically28 - is by far too 
                                                          
25 A. B. Atkinson, (2003). He quotes H. Simon (1957) and H.F. Lydall, (1959) for the first aspect, and S. 
Rosen, (1981) and R. Frank and P. J. Cook, (1995), for the second. 
26 T. Piketty, (2001). The whole reported reasoning comes from A. B. Atkinson and T. Piketty, (2010).    
27 T. Picketty and E. Saez, (2006), p.202. 
28 A. B. Atkinson and D. J. Harrison, (1978). 
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unrealistic. In addition, in order to understand and explain the (if any) shifting mix of capital and 
earned incomes, we need theories that bring the two income sources together in a single 
model. What happens at the top crucially depends on the joint distribution of income sources. 
Are those with large capital incomes also those with high salaries, accumulating assets over 
their careers, or are they separate groups?29 Again quoting Atkinson “ micro-based models...... 
probably provide the most promising strategy to develop convincing empirical tests of the 
determinants and consequences of income and wealth concentration— probably more 
promising than standard cross-country regressions. However our data set, especially because of 
its lack of systematic decomposition between labour income and capital income components, 
and of systematic series on labour and capital tax rates, is unfortunately insufficient to do this in 
a fully satisfactory manner at this stage.30  
Thus, something is in the air31 that we are not yet able to assess properly, that has not yet 
fully modelled.  Both the bottom and the upper part of the earning distribution show that the 
very capitalism has changed since the 1970s. We have a labour market driven by skill-biased 
technological progress, which implies movements within the distribution at the bottom, and a 
principled-agents context at the top of the distribution: salaried dependent workers – that is 
what executives are – that are able to change the nature of the firm, transforming production 
into finance, and promoting themselves in a degree very often independent on the firm 
performances. Their promotions may be influenced also by the globalization of the market for 
managers, who are highly mobile: globalization has raised the rents of those with the very 
highest abilities. Taking a position a bit extreme, for the sake of provocation, technological 
change and globalization can be seen as a partly endogenous business’s choice to weaken the 
labour bargaining position built up so successfully in the 1950s and 1960s. 
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Capitalism has been transformed. I do not intend here to stop and talk about this “new” 
capitalism, which many authors are describing.32 I wish just to recall that what exists now in the 
production sphere of the western rich economies is an unbalance presence of the secondary 
and tertiary sectors: services account for something in between 60 and 80% of the GDP, and 
industry for about 20%, with agriculture on the way of disappearance (for our country of 
investigation, UK, the proportion in 2010 is 77% for services, 22% for industry, and the 
remaining 1% for agriculture). This had implied a radical change in the amount and in the 
quality of the “classical” factors of production (labour and capital, those who get the slices of 
the pie), a supremacy of financial capital over the real capital, a real capital more and more 
sophisticated and – what accounts more – more and more mobile (Multinationals mean also 
huge firms, with their own logic) and a more and more request for human skills. On the top of 
that, the possibility for financial capital to fly in the time one pushes a button where it likes 
best. As Summers writes: “When George Eastman revolutionized photography, he did very well 
and, because he needed a large number of Americans to carry out his vision, the city of 
Rochester had a thriving middle class for two generations. By contrast, when Steve Jobs 
revolutionized personal computing, he and the shareholders in Apple (who are spread all over 
the world) did very well but a much smaller benefit flowed to middle-class American workers 
both because production was outsourced and because the production of computers and 
software was not terribly labour intensive”.33 The mutation of capitalism reverberates on 
inequality through the new rent-seeking positions that have been created. Using abused words, 
globalization has challenged equality. 
In the new wave of capitalism, a crucial role in the inequality story has been played by the 
credit market, by the changed nature of the banking system due to the financial de-regulation, 
by the interest rates charged on borrowing and by the “credit rationing” type of behaviour from 
the side of the banks. If we believe that education is one of the main engines for escaping from 
inequality, its cost means something for what has happened. Real interest rates in the majority 
                                                          
32 Among others, see, for instance, A. Glyn, (2006), or Stiglitz J., (2003).    
33 L. Summers, (2011). 
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of OECD countries increased sharply in the 1980s, and though in the 1990s they were lower 
than in the first half of the 1980s they were well above the level of the 1960s. Low income 
families could not afford directly the cost of high quality education for their children, and could 
not afford it indirectly as well, due to the high cost of borrowing and to the selection operated 
by the banks, more inclined to concede loans whether the university study would provide 
future high-remuneration career (typically: business school).  
Cutting the possibility of changing the relative income position in the social ladder means 
replicate inequality.34 The literature on the intergenerational transmission of income inequality 
seems very pessimistic about the possibility of escaping from inequality for the future 
generations: “Income inequality shows a strong trans-generational tendency: it is regularly 
transmitted from parents to children. A disadvantaged family background negatively affects a 
child’s prospects in terms of both educational attainment and wage earnings”.35   Useless to 
comment how harmful this low intergenerational mobility turns out to be for the dampening of 
inequality (and how pernicious it may be for the attractiveness of the democratic institutions to 
their citizens). 
In concluding this section, and in the aim of connecting it to the previous one, let me 
quote a particularly accurate econometric contribution reporting as a main result that “income 
inequality is relatively stable within countries and it varies significantly across countries”36 
[technically: the observed inter-temporal changes are small relative to the observed differences 
across countries]. Both statements are not surprising and both reflect the same aspect: at the 
end, inequality depends on the country-specific socio-politico-(economic) framework in so far 
as the State does not actively counteract the (unequal) market outcomes. This framework 
cannot be but different from country to country – no single “story” holds for all – and cannot be 
but sluggish to change. Institutions, social norms, constitutional settings, and other structural 
                                                          
34 M. Franzini and M. Raitano, (2009), with a review of the literature. 
35 M. Franzini, (2009), Introduction. 
36 H. Li, L. Squire and H. Zou (1998), p. 26. 
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aspects of a country generally do not change quickly, either in developed countries or in the 
developing ones. We will be back to that in the discussion of my operative choices. 
3.2 Inequality and Democracy 
Before approaching this challenging though slippery theme, it is necessary to clear which 
concept of democracy I am referring to. As a mere symbol of the complexity of the topic, let me 
report three nice definitions of democracy. Democracy is:  
 a system that makes it possible to get rid of a government without spilling 
blood (Popper) 
 the worst form of government except for all the others (Churchill) 
 the voice of the people which creates institutions, and these institutions in 
turn control the government and make it possible to change it without 
violence. In this sense, the demos is the sovereign that gives legitimacy to 
the institutions of democracy (Dahrendorf)37 
Without going at all into the debate on what democracy is – I leave it to the political 
theorists38 – I will refer throughout the paper to the concept of “polyarchy” as developed by 
Dahl39, limiting myself only to stressing what in modern terms is not considered sufficient any 
longer to have a full democracy: i) the most popular definition of democracy, which equates it 
with regular elections, and ii) the commonplace that identifies democracy with majority rule. 
Both are considered to be a fallacy: modern democracies offer many channels to citizens 
besides the elections (associational, partisan, functional, territorial, collective, individual….) in 
order to let the citizens have voice, and democracies are nowadays required to accompany the 
majority rule principle with the protection of minority-rights.40  
                                                          
 37 R. Darhendorf,  (2003). 
38 For all, G. Sartori, (1987), and R. A. Dahl, (2000). An important readings on this theme is also J. 
Schumpeter, (1943).          
39  R. A. Dahl, (1971).  
40 T. L. Karl and P. Schmitter, (1993).  
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Polyarchy is by far the most commonly used concept of democracy especially when the 
interest is in (an attempt of) evaluating it. As formulated by Dahl, the minimum requirements 
for political democracy are: i) freedom to form and join organization; ii) freedom of expression; 
iii) the right to vote; iv) eligibility for public office; v) the right of political leaders to compete for 
support; vi) alternative sources of information; vii) free and fair elections; vii) institution for 
making government policies depend on votes and other expressions of preference. As we will 
see, the problem with Polyarchy (or perhaps with any political variable) is still its measure. 
The relationship between Inequality and Democracy is a two-way relationship as every 
other connection between Politics and Economics: institutions can affect inequality (both in 
diminishing it – through redistribution – and increasing it, via blameless or deliberate 
malfunctions), and inequality can shape institutions empowering some groups more than 
others, thus giving origin to a sort of vicious circle.  
The difficulties to a correct working of democracy when population is divided by income 
and wealth are widely dealt with in the political science literature.41 Eventually, “since Aristotle, 
who observed that great economic inequality leads the wealthy to seek a share of power 
matching their share of resources and so to subvert democratic government, scholars of politics 
have theorized that the proper functioning of a democracy depends on a relatively equal 
distribution of economic resources”.42 
When inequality grows differences between population-groups start to appear or to 
strengthen, and through time what would distinguish these groups is their social distance, 
which can also be enormous and lead to social exclusion through differences in the 
consumption sphere, in health and housing conditions, in the access to education and to the 
labor market, and in the social-relation network (the so-called social capital) and social mobility. 
As Tocqueville had already stated in his unforgettable De la démocratie en Amérique (1835 and 
1840), the degree of equality is the best predictor of democracy stability, and of the quality 
                                                          
41 See, for instance, T. L. Karl, (2000), N. Bermeo, (2009); L. M. Bartels, (2008); E. Thorbecke and C. 
Charumilind, (2002).  
42  F. Solt, (2008), p. 48, stress added. 
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itself of democracy. Extreme income inequality is not as far dangerous as in provoking dramatic 
outcomes as riots or similar – “our” western democracies are perhaps immune from that, who 
knows – but it works in a subtle way in so far as it “has a far more insidious impact on the way 
democratic institutions actually operate. Organizations as diverse as Human Rights Watch, 
Freedom House… have all pointed out how powerful economic and political elites have bent 
laws to their bidding, enfeebled courts, violated rights, corrupted politicians, and run roughshod 
over constitutions and contracts. This makes the state even more susceptible to influence-
trafficking, further increasing inefficiencies and exacerbating inequalities”.43  
On top of everything, and even more worrying to me, is the fact that the failure of a 
proper functioning of the democratic institutions weakens their legitimacy and invites to an 
estrangement from political life and participation. In my opinion the problem is not inequality 
as such but the deterioration of trust44. The trend of de-participation leaves empty spaces that 
may well lead to an oligarchic power (in the specific case of a wealth-driven power, the 
plutarchy, in the Hacker-Pierson terminology, or plutonomy elsewhere), or a power that is 
centred more and more on the interest of the few.  
The relationship between income inequality and democracy is mediated by that one 
between inequality and socio-political processes, which are mostly studied in connection to 
growth as the main target to achieve.45 This means to look at all that can discourage capital 
accumulation, or to look at the inefficiencies of a distortive tax system in order to finance the 
redistribution: typical economic mechanisms I am not interested in here. If the same 
relationship is not studied in connection to growth, the interest goes towards political conflicts 
and democracy-stability in contexts where frequencies of riots, political assassination, and 
probability of government collapse are the possible outcomes. Yet, this is something far from 
my interest here.  
                                                          
43  T. L. Karl, cit., p. 154 
44  In this direction, see C. Fried, (2000).   




On the contrary, an important hint that goes in the direction I too am going to is the 
linkage between income inequality and democracy through the channel represented by 
education, which has in itself the gene of “social equalizer” (education is taken as the 
fundamental basis for equality since Tocqueville’s writings). As we have just seen, the 
relationship is two-way in so far as education affects income inequality through earnings and 
the labour market in general, and income inequality affects education mainly through the 
restraints on the accessibility to high-level schooling: low-income (and low-education as well) 
families are excluded from the credit market, and cannot afford high quality education. What 
accounts more here is the fact that a higher inequality implies less widespread education, since 
rich people resist more to the funding of public schooling through taxes, leading to an 
underfunding of large-scale education. Public spending on education is on average lower in 
countries like Britain and the United States where the rich participate more in the political 
process than the poor and higher in countries like Sweden and Denmark, where levels of 
political participation are approximately similar across the income scale. Many other facets of 
this complex link between inequality and education can also subsist, all suggesting that low-
educated populations might be more easily victim of political manipulation, and less interested 
to the institutions of democracy and to its functioning, which do constitute its quality. This is a 
conclusion that is difficult to test empirically since it requires qualitative data, but I will take it 
into full consideration in explaining the quantitative relationship between inequality and 
democracy.  
It seems46 that there is a certain degree of connection – both at the theoretical and 
empirical levels – between income inequality and crime, or violence at the micro-level. This 
might lead to some reduction in the quality of democracy. Lastly, there is a large body of 
empirical evidence about the negative relationship between income inequality and health 
indicators across countries and within countries and communities. However, it is more difficult 
                                                          
46 E. Thorbecke and C. Charumilind, (2002).                                     
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to envisage immediately the effect of health conditions on democracy and I am not considering 
it any longer.  
4. A Focus on Inequality 
4.1 Defining Economic Inequality 
Inequality is a word that never goes alone and that clarifies itself when accompanied by 
something else. Inequality of what? Resource inequality, opportunity inequality, gender 
inequality..…...  
Inequality must be measured, and nothing could be more difficult both conceptually and 
technically. I will leave both questions to somebody else: the first – how to define inequality – 
mostly to philosophers; the second – how to measure it – to statisticians and mathematicians. I 
will keep myself rigorously within the domain of Economics, where inequality is generally 
associates with income (or wealth, or consumption)47, and it is measured by consolidated, 
though somehow questioned, indices, almost exclusively on a one-dimensional basis. In this 
context, inequality is clearly defined, meaning nothing but “difference” in distribution.48 
Difference or disparity would perhaps be better words, though inequality sounds more 
evocative. 
However, we cannot avoid raising a question. Though strictly tied to Economics, can we 
assess economic inequalities just by looking at cash income? Of course, no, we cannot. People 
can have quite decent or even high living standards even if they have (relatively) low incomes. 
The simplest case is when they can produce much of what they need through home production 
(farmers), but we can think of people who hinge upon their built up savings or of a State which 
provides public goods or services almost free of charge. The reason why cash income is used is 
                                                          
47 However, wealth is rarely investigated because data for wealth are difficult to be obtained. On the 
contrary, consumption (expenditure for goods and services) is used in economies where income data 
are less available. Consumption expenditure tends to be more equally distributed than income. 
48 For instance, Kuznets – one of the leading scholars in the field – admits that “when we say [income] 
inequality we simply mean [income] differences, without regard to their desirability as a system of 
reward or undesirability as a scheme running counter to some ideal of equality”. Quoted by A. B. 
Atkinson, (1983), p. 4. 
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because it is easily measured, and this helps cross-country comparisons. Notwithstanding that, 
we should never forget that money income is only a partial measure of welfare. Mentioning 
welfare takes us to the multidimensionality problem, which entails both technical and 
theoretical difficulties, as we will briefly see in the next section. 
4.2 Measuring Economic Inequality 
Before proceeding, let us just mention three related sets of problems. The length of the 
time period matters because, other things equal, transitory fluctuations smooth out with time, 
thus reducing measured inequality. The unit of account matters as well, and a choice must be 
made among family, individual, household. Equivalence scales (like the OECD one)49 must be 
used in order to be able to compare households with a different number of people and/or with 
a different composition. Income definition is not unique: with or without capital gains and 
imputed rents, pre-tax, after tax, or before tax but after some fiscal deduction, comprehensive 
of in-kind benefits or not. Last but not least, at least two different sources make a great 
difference: fiscal (administrative) data or survey data? All these choices have to be left to the 
kind of problem under observation. 
The measure of inequality is a wide and technically challenging topic, well documented in 
brilliant surveys.
50
 Worthwhile reminding that inequality is measured by a huge amount of 
different indexes, and which one to select for the analysis is not neutral with respect the 
illustration of inequality and, of course, to its evaluation, both verbally and mathematically. This 
is the reason why, probably, economists and almost everybody out of the specific and highly 
restricted circle of “people working on inequality” (mostly statisticians/mathematicians) use the 
Gini index. Though seldom, the Theil index is also used because it is an entropy index and can 
be decomposed.  
Here I limit myself to elucidating some problems, starting with the multidimensionality, 
and to listing the most commonly used measures in the one-dimension case. 
                                                          
49 The incomes of each component are summed together and this amount is divided by a number given 
by the sum of  1.5 for each adult (more than 14 year old) and 0.3 for each child (13 year old or less). 
50 S. P. Jenkins and P. Van Kerm, (2009); F. A. Cowell, 2000.   
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The most known approach in the multi-dimensions context is the “capabilities approach” 
proposed by Sen,51 according to which the two relevant categories are functionings (good 
health, literacy, and so on) and capabilities. Capabilities are nothing else but the amount of 
functionings that each of us can hinge upon, and which can be considered as an indicator of 
freedom. The capability approach is almost entirely a theoretical approach. In fact, “the 
problems [in its empirical implementation] that are new to the multivariate case are the 
weighting structure of the functionings and their degree of substitutability...... Both these 
aspects are not technical hitches but the expression of implicit value judgments”.52 As an 
example of the two problems, let us take a simple representation of a multidimensional index 
in an additive and in a non-additive version 
Si = ∑jwjxij                              Si = { ∑jwjxij
-β
 }
-1/β                                  
i = 1 … N and j = 1 … J 
where Xij   is the jth attribute of individual ith, Wj  the correspondent weight and β is the degree 
of substitutability (β = - 1 perfect substitutability, con β = ∞ perfect complementarity). How to 
fix the weights? One possibility is to treat all attributes equally, either for a desire of minimizing 
interferences, or from a lack of information; the “let the data speak for themselves” is an 
alternative; the use of mathematical algorithms is another. And what about β? Shall we use a 
constant elasticity of substitution (CES) function? Or other and more complex kind of functions? 
As an example of how things work in practice, it should be mentioned that the HDI, (Human 
Development Indicator) which is “the” well known eye-catching indicator used by the UNs 
considers income together with life expectancy and educational achievement53, simply 
averaging among the three.54  
                                                          
51 A. K. Sen, (1980). Among Sen’s numerous  contributions, let us mention A. K. Sen, (1992). 
52 A. Brandolini, (2008), p. 29.     
53 This last item is calculated as a compounded average of the adult population education and of the 
young population schooling. 
54 The HDI measures the average achievement in human developments in a country by taking a simple 
arithmetic mean of three indicators: the logarithm of GDP per capita (Y), life expectancy at birth (L) 
and education. The indicator for education is itself a composite index combining adult literacy (A), 
with a two-third weight, and gross enrolment in primary, secondary and tertiary school (G), with a 
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Connected to welfare economics – and with some built-in degree of ethical value55 – is the 
Pigou-Dalton-Atkinson56 approach, within which the famous Atkinson’s index originates, based 
on the entirely new equally distributed equivalent level of income concept: “the level of income 
per head which if equally distributed would give the same level of social welfare as the present 
distribution”.57 Without going too far into Atkinson’s index, it is worthwhile noticing that it has 
an immediate interpretation: “If [it is equal to] 0.3, for example, it allows us to say that if 
incomes were equally distributed, then we should need only 70% of the present national 
income to achieve the same level of social welfare”.58 In other words, the index points at a 
distributive inefficiency in so far as it measures the welfare loss caused by an unequal 
distribution. Theoretically appealing, the implementation of Atkinson’s index suffers from the 
specification of the “social welfare function”, which is highly questionable. 
Undoubtedly, in nowadays Economics there is a wide interest, and associated research, 
towards the concept of well-being. The development of the Economics of happiness, as a new 
topic on a micro-basis, and the gigantic effort, on a macro-basis, of the Stiglitz-commission59 in 
order to provide a robust theoretical basis for enlarging the concept of GDP and revising the 
entire national accounting scheme, testify that. Within this broad interest towards capturing 
aspects that go beyond the simple “income”, the scholars in the Economics of inequality – 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
one-third weight.  All four elementary indices are normalized by taking the proportional country’s 
achievement over a prefixed scale. 
55 Saying that a distribution is “more” unequal than another means also having a criterion according to 
which it is not preferred.   
56 A. C. Pigou, (1920); H. Dalton, (1920); A. B. Atkinson, (1970).       
57 A. B. Atkinson, (1970), cit., p. 250. “We can then define as our new measure of inequality as 1 minus 
the ratio of the equally distributed equivalent level of income to the mean of the actual distribution. If 
[the index] falls, then the distribution has become more equal: we would require a higher level of 
equally distributed income (relative to the mean) to achieve the same level of social welfare as the 
actual distribution. The measure has, of course, the convenient property of lying between 0 (complete 
equality) and 1 (complete inequality)” [ibidem]. Intuitively, the closer to the mean is the level of 
income per head which if equally distributed would give the same level of social welfare, the more 
equal the distribution is. Whether the two concepts coincide (perfect equality), the ratio is 1 and the 
index is 0. 
58 Ibidem 
59 J. E. Stiglitz, A. K. Sen, J.-P. Fitoussi, (2010). 
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mainly statisticians – are elaborating theoretically refined and empirically challenging measures 
that, however, have not yet come out from the specialists’ inner circle to reach the wider set of 
applied economists.  Modern Economics is a very young discipline, pretty much specialized into 
subfields often scantly communicating, and time is required for the spreading of its advances.  
Beyond the one- and multi-dimension aspect, a second general question about measures 
relies on their “relative” vs. “absolute” version, with the former prevailing both at academic and 
official statistics levels.  “Inequality measures are described as relative when they are invariant 
to proportional transformations (scale invariance) and absolute when they are invariant to 
additive transformations (translation invariance)”60. As an example, “there are good reasons for 
considering absolute income levels. With a doubling of real incomes from their 2005 values, per 
capita income in the United States remains 10 times that of China, but the absolute difference 
increases from $37,583 to $75,166. The world would be getting richer, but the differences 
between countries would be becoming larger in absolute terms. One way in which this can be 
reflected is by taking the absolute mean difference rather than the relative mean difference. The 
absolute mean difference has increased throughout the period, accelerating upward after 1950. 
This alternative—rather neglected—measure of inequality gives a different perspective on the 
evolution of world income distribution”.61 Again, “this absolute criterion was imaginatively 
advocated by Kolm as follows: “In May 1968 in France, radical students triggered a student 
upheaval which induced a workers’ general strike. All this was ended by the Grenelle 
agreements which decreed a 13% increase in all payrolls. Thus, laborers earning 80 pounds a 
month received 10 pounds more, whereas executives who already earned 800 pounds a month 
received 100 pounds more. The Radicals felt bitter and cheated; in their view, this widely 
increased income inequality” [Kolm S., Unequal Inequalities, Journal of Economic Theory, 12, 
1976, 416-442, p. 419]. Kolm’s example looks persuasive. Yet, much of its appeal fades away 
when we consider income reductions rather than increases. Atkinson cites the case of the sailors 
of the British Navy, Atlantic Fleet, at Invergordon, who in 1931 opposed a shilling a day 
                                                          
60 A. B. Atkinson and A. Brandolini,, (2010),  p. 6 
61 Ibidem, p. 7 
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reduction in their pay since “… they did not regard it as fair that they should bear a bigger 
proportionate cut than the officers” (1983, p. 6).”62  
Let us come now to the most usual and “simple” context: the one-dimension and relative 
kind of measure. “There are fifteen well known statistical measures of income inequality. These 
can broadly divided into three groups: (A) measures of variation (or dispersion); (B) measures of 
skewness and (C) measures derived from the empirical laws of income distribution”.63 Without 
entering into the technical details, and reminding that from 1975 (the date of this quotation) 
onwards other indexes surely joined the list, I just mention here for a common knowledge 
seeking, some well known indexes belonging to the one or the other of the groups. The first 
group includes the most common and known indices, like the variance, the coefficient of 
variation (the ratio between the variance and the mean), the relative mean deviation, the 
entropy indexes (like the Theil index or the mean log deviation), which have the nice properties 
of being decomposable into groups thus rendering possible the calculation of inequality within 
and between groups, and, of course, the Gini index, “which is by far the most popular measure 
of inequality worldwide”.64 The second group has some indices aiming at measuring the a-
symmetry of a distribution. In the third we find the Pareto’s alpha, for instance, and all the 
specific shares possessed by various subgroups of the population, like the share of income 
owned by the richest 5 percent of the population, the P90/P10 inter-decile ratio [the ratio of 
the upper (lower) bound value of the ninth decile to that of the first] and – in a non-exhaustive 
list - the P50/P10 inter-decile ratio, which is the ratio of median income to the upper bound 
value of the first decile [all, scale-invariant]. The P90/P10, measuring the ratio of the income of 
a person in the 90th percentile to that of a person in the 10th percentile, is very common, 
especially in developed countries, for a number of reasons. First, such ratios are fairly 
straightforward and easy to interpret, for example, a ratio of 5 means that the income of the 
poorest person in the top 10 per cent of income distribution is five times that of the richest 
                                                          
62 A. Brandolini, (2011), cit., p. 8.                                                                                                                                   
63 T. Stark, (1972), Appendix 3, p. 137, italics and stressing added. 
64  B. Milanovic, (2011), p. 29. 
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person in the bottom 10 per cent. Second, it is easy to calculate, and in developed countries, 
there is often a longer time-series of data that makes it possible to examine changes in income 
inequality over time. An obvious disadvantage is that the P90/P10 does not reflect what 
happens in other parts of the income distribution. All these indicators have different upper and 
lower bounds and relative advantages or disadvantages over one another. For instance, relative to other 
indices the mean log deviation is more sensitive to changes at the bottom of the distribution, and the 
squared coefficient of variation is more sensitive to changes at the top, while the Gini coefficient is less 
sensitive to changes at the two extremes of the distribution.  
Statistical theory and empirical findings confirm that measurement assumptions may 
considerably influence the results In general, “using different scalar inequality measures to 
compare distributions may lead to contradictory conclusions, one distribution appearing more 
unequal than another with respect to one measure, but the opposite being true with another 
measure”.65 What to choose, then? Besides the nature of the problem under investigation, one 
way to choose within the large number of inequality indices available is to evaluate them in 
terms of their properties. This is perhaps one of the reasons why the Gini index is so widely 
adopted as a measure of inequality.  
The GINI 
In 1912 Corrado Gini, an Italian statistician and sociologist, published Variabilità e 
mutabilità (Variability and Mutability),66 where he developed a measure of statistical dispersion 
which became the foremost index for the measure of inequality. 
In order to understand the technical meaning of the Gini index, we must go back to the 
concept of the size-distribution of income. Everything starts with (personal) income data 
collection, and with income recipient units (individuals, households or families) put together 
into (annual) income-classes of regular size (from € 0 to 1000, from 1000 to 2000, and so on).  
The household is an extended version of the family. Family is a concept related to 
personal identity data registration while Household identifies people living together both for 
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 A. B. Atkinson and F. Bourguignon, (2002), p. 7269. 
66 C. Gini, (1912). 
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economic and parental motivations. The household concept is the most widely adopted one, 
both for measuring poverty and inequality 
The histogram is then transformed into a continuous curve through approximation 
techniques which are called parametrical estimations. The log-normal is one of them and it has 
two parameters: mean and variance. Other functions – used in the income-distribution applied 
literature – are the Singh-Maddal and the Dagum (with three parameters), and the four-
parameter generalized β of the second kind. From this income distribution curve we go to a 
frequency distribution of income showing recipient units ranked according to the size of their 
income. The recipient units are put together into groups of equal size with an indication of the 
share of total income accruing to each group. The most usual groupings are percentiles, deciles 
and quintiles. The size distribution of income described in percentiles can be graphically 
expressed by the “Lorenz- curve”,67 which joins together the plotting of the cumulative shares 
of population, arranged by rising income on the horizontal axis (up to 100%) and the shares of 
income enjoyed by the corresponding fractions of population (cumulative percentages of 
income, up to 100% as well) on the vertical axis.  
Now that we know the Lorenz curve into a square, let us look for the GINI.  
The meaning of the Gini (then transformed into a coefficient, as we will see) is the 
evaluation of the area between the diagonal of the square and the Lorenz curve. Intuitively, the 
bigger this area is the more inequality is present. But, does the same area mean the same 
inequality? No, as you can easily see when looking at four different Lorenz curves equally 
determining the same area. Is more equal a society where more people have low income or a 
society where more people has high income, within the same global inequality? Who is the 
minority, the rich or the poor?   
Anyhow, once the area is calculated, its value is “purged” by every dimensional feature by 
being transformed into a coefficient: the Gini is nothing but the ratio of “our” area – the one 
bounded by the Lorenz curve and the diagonal – and the area of the triangle (one half of the 
                                                          
67 M. O. Lorenz, (1905). 
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square). When there is perfect equality the Lorenz curve coincides with the diagonal, and the 
Gini value would be zero: when it is inequality to be perfect, its value would be 1. While in the 
linear case the computation of the Gini is easy, in the non-linear case some math has obviously 
to be involved, and things might not be so easy. But we leave that to statisticians and 
mathematicians.  
Being a ratio, Gini – how it is commonly called – has many advantages (comparability, 
scale and population independence, transfer principle obedience):  
 scale independence: if every income is multiplied by a constant, the index doesn’t 
change 
 population independence: if every income is repeated k times, the index doesn’t  
change 
 transfer principle: if income is transferred from a rich person to a poor person the 
resulting distribution is more equal 
But Gini index, like other measures of inequality, suffers from a number of drawbacks. 
First, it considers only one dimension of inequality (but this is common to all the one-
dimensional measures); then, economies with equal Gini can have very different distribution [a 
society whose Lorenz curve is linear from (0,0) to (0.5,0) and then linear to (1,1) – that is a 
society where half of population has no income, and the other half shares all the income 
equally – has the same Gini of a society in which 75% of population equally shares 25% of 
income and the remaining 25% of population equally shares the 75% of income: the Lorenz 
curve is linear from (0,0) to (0.75,0.25) and then is linear to (1,1); it is influenced by the thinness 
of the chosen measurement unit (the granularity); does not identify where in the income 
distribution the rise (or fall) in income inequality may have occurred; it may remain unchanged 
while the distribution changes also significantly because redistributive forces work in different 
directions at different points. Regarding the Gini inadequacy to capture where in the income 
distribution the rise (or fall) in income inequality may have occurred, if this is our interest we 
have to look at some decomposition of data and confront it separately with the global 
distribution. 
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5. Stylized Facts                                    
The expression “stylized facts” is an economic jargon. With the aim of defining it for this 
seminar, I surfed the web and I found in Wikipedia something that I myself might have written.  
From Wiki: 
The expression “stylized facts” was introduced by the economist Nicholas Kaldor in the 
context of a debate on economic growth theory in 1961 [Nicholas Kaldor, Capital 
Accumulation and Economic Growth.' In: Lutz/Hague (eds.): The Theory of Capital, London, 
pp. 177-222],[2] expanding on model assumptions made in a 1957 paper [Nicholas Kaldor, “A 
model of economic growth”, The Economic Journal 67 (268), pp. 591-624]. Criticizing the 
neoclassical models of economic growth of his time, Kaldor argues that theory construction 
should begin with a summary of the relevant facts. However, to handle the problem that 
“facts as recorded by statisticians, are always subject to numerous snags and qualifications, 
and for that reason are incapable of being summarized”, he suggests that theorists “should 
be free to start off with a stylized view of the facts – i.e. concentrate on broad tendencies, 
ignoring individual detail”. With respect to broad tendencies that result from such a process, 
Kaldor coins the term “stylized facts”. 
Which are the stylized facts of the phenomenon of (income) inequality? Are there any stylized 
facts of the relationship between democracy and inequality? These are my next steps. Since the trend 
in income inequality is nowadays widely documented in a very precise and detailed way, in 
what follows I will largely hinge upon the existing literature.  
The conventional version of the story about historical trends in inequality is that its 
reduction “in developed countries started only with the Ist WW. In reality, Kuznets had already 
observed that this process had started in Denmark before the Ist WW, Soltow’s data …. are also 
indicative of a long trend of inequality reduction dating from well before the Ist WW in Norway, 
and Kravis indicates a pattern of narrowing inequality in the US between 1890 and 1920. The 
pre-Ist WW situation in Great Britain was basically stable but there are also some indications of 
a reduction in inequality at that stage. However, it has to be admitted that the reduction in 
inequality has been sharper and more general since the Ist WW than at any time before.”68 It is 
of some interest noticing for what follows that at the beginning of the 1970s and relating to the 
                                                          
68 F. Paukert, (1973), p. 120, Footnote 1                                                
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post-war period, “the data …support the hypothesis expressed but not fully tested by Kuznets 
and Oshima that with economic development income inequality tends to increase then becomes 
stable and then decreases”.69 In reality, another wide empirical study conducted over a sensibly 
longer post-war period (1947-1994), put into light “that the very fact that inequality has been 
shown to be relatively stable while incomes have almost certainly increased significantly during 
the 40-year period under study suggests that there is unlikely to be much support in the data for 
the systematic relationship between inequality and income suggested by Kuznets”.70 
Things however changed undoubtedly after the 1970s. What happened after that 
moment? “In the past twenty-five years, we have witnessed a sharp reversal of that equalizing 
tendency. Not only in the United States and the United Kingdom, but almost everywhere: income 
distribution has become more unequal in China, Russia, and India. The latter three could be 
explained away by arguing that they are still at the middle (developing) stage. But this 
explanation does not work for West European countries and the United States. There, the 
declining portion of the inverted U curve was transformed since the Thatcher-Reagan era into a 
rising portion. Thus, we now have something that looks like a reclined letter S, a shape like this ~ 
”.71 Two interesting and suspicious stylized facts are that: 1) the decline in the wage-share (over 
GDP) by around 10% across 17 OECD countries since 1976 affected - though to different 
degrees - most industrial sectors, thing that reflects more than just changes in the structure of 
GDP from industries with a higher wage share towards those with a lower one;72 2) with few 
exceptions, changes in the income share of the richest 1% of the population account for most 
of the increase in the income share of the top decile of the income distribution. Overall, over 
the entire period from the mid-1980s to the mid-2000s, the dominant pattern is one of a fairly 
widespread increase in inequality (in two-thirds of all countries). The rises are stronger UK and 
US, in Finland, Norway and Sweden (from a low base), in Germany, Italy, and the Netherlands 
                                                          
69  F. Paukert, cit., p. 121 
70  H. Li, L. Squire and H. Zou, (1998), p. 42.       
71  B. Milanovic, (2011), p. 91.            
72  A. Glyn, (2006).                                           
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(from a higher base).73 Gini index, mean-log deviation, standard coefficient of variation, inter-
decile ratios like P90/P10, P50/P10, different data sources [OECD, LIS (Luxembourg Income 
Study), and Eurostat], all tell the consistent story of an increase in inequality. In addition, 
though this is another story, countries that achieve the largest redistribution through taxes and 
transfers generally record the lowest inequality in the distribution of household disposable 
income, although with considerable variation across countries.  
It is worthwhile spending some few words on what happened in the high portion of 
income distribution since, accordingly to Atkinson, this is the very relevant, important, 
intriguing, stylized fact: the so called “top-incomes problem”. This is the problem that especially 
the US are facing now, that fills the newspapers, that echoes from the media, that everybody is 
talking about.  
“During the post-1970 period, one does observe a major divergence between rich 
countries. While top income shares have remained fairly stable in France and other Continental 
European countries over the past three decades, they have increased enormously in the United 
States.…… The United Kingdom and other Anglo-Saxon countries tend be somewhere in between 
the European pattern and the U.S. pattern. Note that the rise of United States top-income 
shares is not due to the revival of top capital incomes, but rather to the very large increases in 
top wages (especially top executive compensation). As a consequence, top executives (the 
“working rich”) have replaced top capital owners (the “rentiers”) at the top of the U.S. income 
hierarchy over the course of the 20th century. This contrasts with the European pattern, where 
top capital incomes are still predominant at the top of the distribution (albeit at lower levels 
than at the beginning of the 20th century). This provides yet another example as to why it is 
vital to be able to break down income distribution series by income source (without such a 
decomposition, it is virtually impossible to understand the forces at play)”.74 Also in Atkinson’s 
view, the data on the widening in income-distribution tell a different story for the US and the 
continental Europe, since:  “we have not seen a significant rise at the top in mainland European 
                                                          
73 A. B. Atkinson,  (2003), p. 495                                                                                                          
74 T. Piketty,  (2005). The same point is made also by T. Piketty  and E. Saez, (2006), p. 202. 
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countries; ….. the bottom decile in the US has not fallen relative to the median in recent years 
over the last ten years [rather they have increased. Between 1987 and 1996 the ratio increased 
from the 44 per cent …. to 48 per cent]; the rise in dispersion in the Anglo-Saxon countries is 
pervasive, affecting nearly all occupational groups”.75 
Accordingly, the unifying explanation – the Transatlantic Consensus - of globalization as 
“the” main cause for increase in inequality does not hold: the falling demand for unskilled labor 
together with the increasing demand for the skilled one should have led to increased wage 
dispersion in the US – where the labor market enjoys a wide flexibility – and to a rise in 
unemployment in Europe, where the labor market conditions put a floor on the wage fall. It is 
true that earnings dispersion has been widening, but this is mainly due to what is happening at 
the top. “First, the personal distribution of income is subject to a wide variety of forces, 
operating in different sectors of the economy, and in different markets, so that we need to look 
not just at wages but also at the capital market recognizing that there has been a shift towards 
capital income and a rise in the real rate of return [in the majority of the G7]; second, the 
explanation should not be limited to a simple competitive supply-and-demand story, but should 
incorporate the institutional determinants of wages and employment, and recognize the role of 
convention and social norms; third, for these reasons, we should not expect the same 
developments in all countries, particularly given the role of national policies; put differently, the 
evolution of income inequality is not simply the product of common economic forces: it also 
represents the impact of institutions and policies over which we have choice”.76 Looking at the 
top-incomes, Atkinson and Picketty report that “there was in fact considerable diversity of 
experience over the period from 1949 to the beginning of the twenty-first century … and during 
the 50 years since 1949 individual countries followed different time paths.77  .... There is just one 
case — Finland — where there is a pattern of rise/fall/rise… Of the remaining 15 countries, one 
can distinguish a group of 6 ‘flat’ countries (France, Germany, Switzerland, the Netherlands, 
                                                          
75  A. B. Atkinson,  (2000), p. 14.                                                                                   
76  Ibidem, pp. 16-17. 
77  A. B. Atkinson and T. Piketty (eds.), (2010), p. 682.                                                                                                
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Japan, Singapore), and a group of 9 ‘U-shaped’ countries (UK, USA, Canada, Australia, New 
Zealand, India, Argentina, Sweden, Norway). ... [They] appear to fit, to varying degrees, the U-
shape hypothesis that top shares have first fallen and then risen over the post-war period”……… 
And as for the composition within the top 1%, “in Table 13.5 we assemble the findings for the 
‘next 4 per cent’ (those in the second to fifth percentile groups) and the ‘second vingtile group’ 
(those in the sixth to tenth percentile groups). In many cases—15 out of 19—the top 1 per cent 
are different, in the sense that the changes in income concentration have particularly affected 
this group. For some countries, the ‘next 4 per cent’ exhibit some of the same features as the top 
1 per cent (as in the UK in recent decades), so that it would be fairer to talk of concentration 
among the top 5 per cent, but typically the second vingtile group does not share the same 
experience. …. Being in the top 1 per cent does not necessarily imply being rich, and there are 
also marked differences within this group. The very rich are different from the rich”.78 
Just few words and two Tables about disposable income, which measures the amount of 
resources – wealth and human capital aside – that people can count on.  “The countries … fall 
into some distinctive clusters. Inequality, as measured by the decile ratio, is least in Nordic 
countries plus the Netherlands and the Czech and Slovak Republics with values of three or less. 
The two other Benelux countries (Belgium and Central Europe (France, Switzerland, Germany, 
Austria, Slovenia) and three other Eastern European countries (Hungary, Poland, Romania) 
come next at 3.2-3.6. These precede the Anglo-Saxon nations (Canada, Australia, Ireland and 
the United Kingdom), which have decile ratios comprised between 3.9 and 4.6, and the Southern 
European countries (Italy, Spain, Greece and Portugal) plus Israel, whose ratios fall between 4.5 
and 5.0. Only the United States, Estonia, Mexico and Russia have values in excess of five79 
...........…... The United States has the highest inequality of disposable incomes, although the 
dispersion of market incomes is on the high side but not far from most other countries; it is 
below the values recorded for France and the United Kingdom, besides Poland and Israel. The 
fact is that the percentage reduction in before-tax-and-benefit inequality in the United States is 
                                                          
78  Ibidem, p. 687 
79 A.  Brandolini and T. M. Smeeding,, (2008), p.6.   
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a mere 22 per cent. If we exclude Taiwan, where redistribution has a tiny impact, only 
Switzerland shows a reduction as low as the United States, but the Swiss start from a much 
more equal distribution and end with a Gini index below the average. These percentage 
reductions are very consistent with the patterns of aggregate public spending. High-spending 
Northern and Central European nations have the highest degree of inequality reduction, from 36 
to 45 per cent; the Anglo-Saxon (excluding the United States) nations are next with 28 to 33 per 
cent reductions; the United States and Switzerland are, as just seen, at the bottom of the 
scale..................The nations which redistribute the most are not necessarily the ones who have 
the greatest degree of market income inequality: before-tax-and-benefit incomes in Finland and 
the Netherlands are far more equally distributed than in the United States”. 80 
6. Case-Study and Work-Plan 
In order to make the work plan as clearer as possible, I list here all the features of the research, 
motivating what I am doing step by step. 
Am I concerned with:  
 Efficiency? Ethics? NO 
A long-lasting question is the trade-off between equity and efficiency. In its extreme 
version, redistribution and state intervention are dangerous because they reduce the benefits 
of free market economy and can eventually make the people they want to help worse off. A 
very common sentence is that “The poor will be better-off with a small slice of a large cake than 
a large slice of a small cake”. I strongly believe that equality is desirable independently of its 
consequences on economics since it is the central component of social justice. However, in my 
talk I would avoid completely this aspect, which is a philosophical one and goes out of my skills 
and beyond the aim of this paper. Nor I would talk about the efficiency issue, which is mainly 
connected to growth. Thus, instead of treating (in)equality as an ethical issue, or treat it as an 
                                                          
80
 Ibidem, p. 8-9 
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economic variable, I would assume a cynic view arguing that equality is desirable since 
inequality is dangerous.  
Am I interested into differences across countries, or solely into what happens in one country?  
 “Between” or “Within”? WITHIN 
As far as I know, all the existing studies (not so many, indeed) provide cross-country 
analyses, focussing on differences among countries. I am not interested in comparison for 
several reasons: developing countries differ in fundamental ways from the developed ones and 
I would never put them together; democracies in transition have to be studied separately as 
well. What I want to look at here belongs to the universe of the developed countries with fully 
grounded democracy. Even within this universe things are different: the kind and the intensity 
of policies, their timing, the country-specific social norms, their position in the global economic 
context and so on. Thus, I will choose to concentrate on a single country, and I will perform a 
time-series analysis. In fact, I am persuaded that the effect of inequality causing a reduction of 
democracy in a country that was initially highly democratic, must be a long through-time effect. 
In a future step of the research I will proceed with a comparison – within the universe of rich, 
developed, long-lasting democratic countries – to test why the current rising inequality pertains 
sensibly more to English-speaking countries than to the continental Europe. Language cannot 
be obviously the explanation! 
Shall I care about.. 
 Poverty, deprivation, social exclusion? NO.  
People are interested in both world inequality and world poverty, but the two literatures are 
separate,81 with an uneasy relationship between them.82 Here the perplexities about the 
technicalities of multidimensional indices apply (see below) 
Am I considering… 
 What Inequality? MONETARY INEQUALITY  
                                                          
81 A. B. Atkinson and F. Bourguignon, (2002).                 
82 A. B.  Atkinson and A. Brandolini, (2010).                                                                                             
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Since no reliable multidimensional well-being indices still exist,83 analyses of inequality are 
usually performed using monetary indicators only.  
 What monetary inequality? INCOME INEQUALITY 
Consumption instead of income is less significant for the phenomenon of inequality 
(people can use piled-up savings or indebtedness) and it is used when income data are not 
available.  
The study of global household wealth is at an embryonic stage. Wealth data are becoming 
to be collected since very recently on a standardized basis (LWS), but data on the level of 
wealth remains poor for many countries. Information on the pattern of wealth within countries 
is even scarcer. The precise definition of personal wealth has not been agreed, and the 
appropriate methods of valuation are not always clear. Much work remains to be done to refine 
the estimates of wealth level by country, to improve the estimates of wealth distribution within 
countries, to explore the pattern of wealth holdings within families, and so on. For evident 
reasons (inheritances, multiform aspects of wealth some of which widely depending on market-
price fluctuations, and so on) wealth is not considered as a good indicator for monetary 
inequality.84 However, especially with regards to the present widening of inequality wealth is 
reputed to be an important variable.  
 What measure of Income Inequality? The GINI COEFFICIENT, the P90/10, the P90/5, 
the SHARE of TOP 1%, 5%, 10% and the SHARE of BOTTOM 1%, 5%, 10%, and  the 
Foster-Wolfson polarization index. 
Following the warnings on the different results that different indexes can produce, and 
being aware that Gini does not reveal opposite movements within the distribution, we consider 
also the classical intra-distribution inequality indexes like all the various forms of inter-decile 
ratios. In addition, just in order to have an idea though preliminary of what happens to the 
                                                          
83  A. Brandolini, (2008).                         
84  A. B. Atkinson, (1983).  
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middle of the distribution, we use also the F-W polarization index.85 All these measures are 
computed on market-incomes, for the part aiming at connecting “new capitalism” and 
inequality. These same measures will be calculated on a disposable income concept for the part 
aiming at evaluating the relationship between inequality and democracy, on the hypothesis 
that the degree of people’s discomfort towards democracy and institutions depends on the 
effective amount of resources they have, or they have access to. 
 What definition of democracy? 
I will hinge upon the concept of “Polyarchy” elaborated by Dahl, which represents by far 
the definition referred to by the largest number of researchers on this field. Since data shortage 
on these concepts - always relevant – become impressive when using a time series analysis 
instead of a cross country one, the variable(s) for democracy is based on Dahl’s concept, it is 
not the Dahl’s concept. My hypothesis is that the variables used here would imply a 
deterioration of the quality of democracy within the effective participation, enlightened 
understanding and control of the agenda categories.    
 Where (and when) to apply the analysis to? UK  
(from 1972  to 2009 for “inequality estimation” and from 1973 to 2004 for “democracy 
estimation”) 
From the stylized facts it appears that the phenomenon of rising inequality – though a 
general one in rich OECD countries – applies particularly to UK and US. Many researchers are 
working on the US case, which is THE case.  The “Winner-take-all-politics” 86 opened a wide debate here 
                                                          
85  This index is based on the principle that polarization depends on the distance of incomes from the 
median. After having ordered incomes from the lowest to the highest one a curve is calculated, 
which represents the distance (normalized on the median) of the incomes from the median. As for 
the Lorenz curve, cumulative distributions are then calculated, getting a figure symmetrical 
with respect to the median. “In this paper we propose a range-free approach to measuring the 
middle-class and polarization… The approach yield two polarization curves which like the Lorenz 
curve in inequality analysis, signals unambiguous increases in polarization”, J. E. Foster and M. 
Wolfson, (2010), p. 247. 
86    J. S. Hacker and P. Pierson, (2010).   
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in the US:  in a plethora of comments, an entire issue of Politics and Society was devoted to it 87 with 
contributions of economists, sociologists and political scientist. In a way, what happened so markedly in 
the US – the American exceptionalism - has been already casted into a framework by Hacker and 
Person:  “policy has, through new laws and through the politically imposed failure to update policy to 
reflect changing social circumstances, or “drift,” played a critical (if  far from exclusive) role in generating 
winner-take-all inequality; and a  marked change in the distribution of organized political power has 
played a central (if, again, far from exclusive) role in promoting these policy changes. ………. Of course, 
rising inequality also has had broad economic roots, from the globalization of trade and finance to 
changes in workplace and financial technologies. Yet these economic trends cannot easily explain why 
inequality has taken such a stronger hold in the United States than it has in other rich democracies 
buffeted by similar forces, nor why America’s inequality explosion has been fueled so strongly by gains at 
the top. To answer these questions requires taking seriously the transformation of U.S. government 
policy over this period. Economic forces did not sweep through a stable policy landscape; rather they 
were channeled by very specific policy choices—both the rewriting of rules to enable winner-take-all 
outcomes and the deliberate failure to update rules in ways that would challenge those outcomes. And 
to complete the circle, organized groups that benefited from the winner-take-all economy — and which 
took advantage of a new political playing fielded tilted toward their interests — demanded and 
supported these policy choices”.88 In other words, the American exceptionalism has already its own 
explanation in the absence of a consolidated quantitative explanation, on a single country basis, of a less 
policy-dependent evolution of income inequality. This is why I chose to focus on UK, an as much 
consolidated democracy and rich western country with a sharply increasing inequality. Nobody is 
working on the UK case, which is subtler and more interesting to me, also because the income 
composition at the very top is less earnings- than wealth-based and, moreover, because UK is a 
country with higher taxation level and that redistributes more than the US. In addition, I like to 
remind that UK is the country that invented the modern Welfare State and was a country with a 
level of inequality much lower than the U.S. 
 
                                                          
87 Politics & Society, 38(2), 2010. 
88 J. S. Hacker and P. Pierson, (2010), p. 266-7. This same opinion is shared also by P. Krugman 
throughout his book  The conscience of a liberal, (2007).          
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 How to articulate the investigation? 
What I intend to do is a quantitative assessment of how much the current rising income 
inequality in UK is determined by the “new” (financial) capitalism and of how much inequality 
impacts on the UK old and mature democracy. In the first part, I do not intend to explain 
inequality but only to link it to the “epochal” economic passage we are in. In the second part I 
am simply looking for “movements of de-democratization …… within the democratic regime” as 
it has been recently put speaking about the US.89  
First:  how much of inequality has been determined by the nowadays capitalism? 
↓ 
1. Inequality as a dependent variable 
Second: is inequality able to “deteriorate” democracy? 
↓ 
2. Inequality as an independent variable 
Between the two steps the concept of income on which inequalities indices are drawn 
upon has to be changed. While in the first part of the research I am interested to what the 
changing nature of capitalism has produced on inequality – and the right concept here is 
market income – in the second part I investigate on the effect of inequality on democracy, and 
the right concept here is disposable income, the income after public transfers are added and 
taxes and social security contributions are deducted, that is to say the amount of resources 
people enjoy effectively. It is widely recognized 90 that the differences across countries are in 
part due to different government policies, and that good government policies can make a 
difference in reducing inequality. Thus, it is important to assess whether – after redistribution – 
inequality can still lead to a political dissatisfaction. The difference between the Gini index for 
market incomes and the Gini index for disposable incomes is in fact a common measure of the 
level of redistribution.  
                                                          
89 J. J. Linz and A. Stepan, (2011).  
90 For instance, the last two OECD Reports  on inequality. 
43 
 How to estimate the effects?  
The quantitative procedure I will use differs between the two steps of the analysis.  
In the first one (where inequality is the dependent variable) a linear regression analysis is used 
in the form of the Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) method that allows estimating from the data 
the unknown parameters that link the dependent variable to the independent ones. Given: 
 The unknown parameters, denoted as β,  
 The independent variables X. 
 The dependent variable, Y. 
A regression model relates Y to a function of X and β. 
 
In the second one (where “democracy” is the dependent variable), a probit model is used, that 
is to say a regression model in which the dependent variable is a dummy variable. In this type of 
model, the probability that the variable Y takes value equal to 1, given the vector of 
independent variables X is modeled91: 
Pr(Y=1|X) = Φ (Xß) 
7. The empirical approach 
7.1 First stage: to inequality 
In this Section the description of the variables, the estimation procedure, and the Tables for the 
results – all related to the inequality context – are presented.  
                                                          
91 The Probability that Y=1 is not a linear function of X, such as in a OLS regression, because it could lead 
to an estimated probability greater than 1 or lower than 0. The Probability that Y=1 is therefore a 
function Φ of Xß , where Φ is the cumulative density function of the standard normal distribution. By 
construction: 0≤Φ(Xß) ≤1 
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Dependent variable: INCOME INEQUALITY 
↓ 
Variables for inequality:  
1) The Gini index  
2) The Foester-Walfson polarization index 
3) The interdecile ratio P90/10 
4) The interdecile ratio P90/50 
5) The share top 1% 
6) The share top 5% 
7) The share top 10% 
8) The share bottom 1%  
9) The share bottom 5%  
10) The share bottom 10%  
All the indexes relate to market-income, which includes labor income (from 
employment and self-employment) and other incomes, i.e. investment-income and income 
from private pensions. The indexes have been calculated on individual weekly market-income 
coming from two surveys: the Family Expenditure Survey that covers the period 1971-2000 and 
the Family Resources Survey, collected from 1994 to 2009.  The time span of the estimates is 
1972-2009. 
Independent Variables: 
1) EDUCATION: Proportion of people aged 20-24 with education level lower than A-level 
(lower than a high-school type). Source: our elaborations on General Household Survey for 
1972-2006 and on Family Resources Survey for 2008 and 2009. The GHS is one of the most 
important surveys collected every year on families and households in the UK. It collects data 
on households, families and people, family information, including marriage, fertility, 
cohabitation, education, health, smoking, drinking, migration, etc. Range: [0-100]. 
http://www.esds.ac.uk/government/ghs/ 
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2) UNION DENSITY: it is a weighted average of two ratios. The first is the ratio between 
total wages of unionized workers and total wages in the economy and the second is the ratio 
between total salaries of unionized workers and total salaries in the economy. The weights are 
the quota of wages and salaries on the total. Source: ICTWSS, Database on Institutional 
Characteristics of Trade Unions, Wage Setting, State Intervention and Social Pacts).            
Range:  [0-100] 
3) FTSE: it is the English Stock Market Price index provided by the Financial Times together 
with the London Stock Exchange. Source: DATASTREAM.  Range: from 111 (1975) to 3300 
(2007).  
4) FREEDOM TO TRADE. This index is taken from the Economic Freedom Dataset 
(Gwartney, Hall and Lawson 2011). The Economic Freedom Dataset includes data on Economic 
Freedom in different domains (http://www.freetheworld.com/datasets_efw.html). The 
components of the index are the following: “taxes on international trade”, “regulatory trade 
barriers”, (i.e. non-monetary trade obstacles), “size of the trade sector relative to expected”, 
“black market exchange rates”, (expressing the difference between the official and the black 
market domestic currency exchange rate), and “International capital market controls”, 
summarizing capital controls and foreign investment restrictions (Gwartney, Hall and Lawson 
2011b). The higher the index, the higher is the “freedom to trade”. Range: [0 to 10]. 
5) M2 AS A RATIO GDP (M2/GDP). M2 is the “more liquid” definition of money: currency 
plus demand deposits. GDP is the Gross Domestic Product. Source: World Bank. 
6) FES is a dummy variable that takes value equal to 1 if the index of market income 
inequality has been drawn from the Family Expenditure Survey, 0 if from the Family Resources 
Survey. This variable controls for systematic differences in the collection of income data 
between the two surveys. 
7) CREDIT MARKET REGULATION (CMR). This index is taken from the same dataset as 
above:  Economic Freedom Dataset (Gwartney, Hall and Lawson 2011). It includes “ownership 
of banks”, “foreign bank competition” (measuring the presence of foreign banks in the banking 
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sector), "extension of credit to the private sector”, “interest rate controls” and “negative real 
interest rates”. Range: [0 to 10]. The higher the index the freer is the credit market. 
8) A time trend (YEAR) has been added in a second step in order to remedy for the non-
stationarity that seemed to be present at the beginning. Since the results (and the extremely 
high R-squared) did not change and since the Durbin-Watson test was not sustaining any serial 
correlation of the residuals, that seemed to exclude the non-stationarity in variance - we did 
not proceed with any co-integration analysis or any estimation on the differences. This is 
something that might be done in a future step. 
As far as the estimation procedure is concerned, the OLS method has been used and the 
variables are estimated in levels: thus the reading is “the unit variation in y following a unit 
variation in x”. Estimations in logs have also been performed, in order to be able to read the 
coefficients more immediately in terms of % variations, i.e. elasticity. These Tables are not 
provided here, but are available on request.  
The results presented relate to the ten Models [1-10] – having as dependent variable the 
ten inequality indicators we have calculated (the Gini index, the Foster Wolfson polarization 
index, the inter-decile ratios P90/10 and P90/50, the top 1%, 5%, 10%  income shares, and the 
bottom 1%, 5%, 10%) – in the two versions (A) and (B), which differ solely for the variable 
which is intended to represent the money/credit market. In the (A) version, the variable 
selected is “M2/GDP”, while in the (B) version the variable is “CMR”. The results for these 20 
Models are in Tables I. 
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Table I.1 
Models  [1-10]  
Version (A): with M2/GDP 
(level-level model)  
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 Gini FW P90/10 P90/50 
Education  0.0016*** 0.0028*** 0.26*** 0.012*** 
Range (0-100) (4.10) (4.54) (3.01) (4.09) 
Union density  -0.0036*** -0.0069*** -0.35* -0.029*** 
Range (0-100) (4.44) (5.47) (1.93) (4.75) 
FTSE*100092  0.0044 -0.0099 -1.30 -0.0048 
(111 to 3321) (0.77) (1.14) (1.03) (1.11) 
Freedom to trade   0.011*** 0.015*** 1.39* 0.076*** 
(0-10) (2.98) (2.80) (1.77) (2.84) 
M2/GDP  0.000038 -0.00026 -0.055** -0.0014 
(0-100) (0.33) (1.49) (2.18) (1.61) 
Fes 0.0097* 0.042*** 4.16*** 0.13*** 
 (1.80) (4.99) (3.49) (3.11) 
Year 0.00029 0.0015 0.33 0.013* 
 (0.30) (0.98) (1.53) (1.80) 
Constant -0.15 -2.46 -633.3 -23.5 
 (0.08) (0.83) (1.49) (1.63) 
Observations 40 40 40 40 
R2 0.908 0.882 0.773 0.906 
Absolute t statistics in parentheses 
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01 
 
                                                          
92
 In order to avoid showing very low numbers, the estimated coefficient of the FTSE has been multiplied by 1000. 
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Models [1-10] 
Version (A):  with M2/GDP (continued) 
 (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) 










Education  0.00048* 0.00078** 0.0010*** -0.00000068 -0.0000066 -0.000050*** 
Range (0-100) (1.81) (2.45) (3.05) (1.08) (1.39) (3.78) 
Union density  -0.00066 -0.0018** -0.0025*** 0.0000023* 0.000017 0.000075*** 
Range (0-100) (1.21) (2.69) (3.52) (1.73) (1.69) (2.75) 
FTSE*1000  0.00013*** 0.012** 0.0090* -0.000013 0.000034 0.000028 
(111 to 3321) (3.41) (2.55) (1.86) (1.38) (0.50) (0.15) 
Freedom to trade   0.0036 0.0057* 0.0073** -0.0000056 -0.000093** -0.00029** 
(0-10) (1.51) (1.99) (2.41) (0.98) (2.18) (2.45) 
M2/GDP  0.00023*** 0.00024** 0.00020** 0.00000029 0.00000030 0.0000061 
(0-100) (2.99) (2.62) (2.06) (1.55) (0.22) (1.59) 
Fes -0.012*** -0.0078* -0.0030 0.0000066 -0.00014** -0.00063*** 
 (3.22) (1.79) (0.66) (0.76) (2.19) (3.46) 
Year -0.0010 -0.00067 -0.00027 -0.00000086 -0.0000096 -0.000030 
 (1.55) (0.86) (0.33) (0.56) (0.83) (0.92) 
Constant 2.01 1.49 0.81 0.0019 0.021 0.066 
 (1.57) (0.96) (0.50) (0.61) (0.91) (1.03) 
Observations 40 40 40 40 40 40 
R2 0.894 0.928 0.933 0.812 0.730 0.802 
Absolute t statistics in parentheses 





  Version (B):  with Credit Market Regulation 
(level-level model)  
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 Gini FW P90/10 P90/50 
Education  0.00055 0.00071 -0.064 0.0033 
Range (0-100) (1.18) (0.96) (0.59) (0.87) 
Union density  -0.0024*** -0.0056*** -0.19 -0.025*** 
Range (0-100) (3.13) (4.62) (1.05) (3.93) 
FTSE *1000 -0.0027 -0.024*** -3.60*** -0.11** 
(111 to 3321) (0.51) (2.88) (2.89) (2.54) 
Freedom to trade   0.010*** 0.021*** 2.53*** 0.10*** 
(0-10) (4.26) (5.56) (4.56) (5.43) 
CMR  0.0083*** 0.013*** 1.96*** 0.054** 
(0-10) (3.36) (3.30) (3.36) (2.66) 
Fes 0.0087* 0.040*** 3.83*** 0.12*** 
 (1.86) (5.30) (3.47) (3.06) 
Year 0.00056 -0.000072 0.0013 0.0049 
 (0.97) (0.08) (0.01) (1.02) 
Constant -0.73 0.50 -5.38 -7.69 
 (0.63) (0.27) (0.02) (0.81) 
Observations 40 40 40 40 
R2 0.932 0.906 0.807 0.917 
Absolute t statistics in parentheses 





  Version (B):  with Credit Market Regulation 
 (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) 












Education  0.00038 0.00039 0.00039 0.0000016** 0.0000040 -0.0000077 
Range (0-100) (0.97) (0.86) (0.89) (2.20) (0.68) (0.47) 
Union density  0.00020 -0.00056 -0.0011 0.00000078 0.0000064 0.000051* 
Range (0-100) (0.30) (0.75) (1.55) (0.63) (0.66) (1.88) 
FTSE  0.013*** 0.0097* 0.0052 0.0000035 0.00011 0.00032* 
(111 to 3321) (2.85) (1.90) (1.06) (0.42) (1.56) (1.72) 
Freedom to trade   -0.00092 0.00098 0.0034 -0.000012*** -0.00010*** -0.00042*** 
(0-10) (0.46) (0.43) (1.55) (3.06) (3.34) (4.98) 
CMR (0-10) 0.0026 0.0050** 0.0065*** -0.000015*** -0.000076** -0.00026*** 
 (1.25) (2.10) (2.77) (3.72) (2.40) (2.97) 
Fes -0.012*** -0.0081* -0.0036 0.0000090 -0.00013** -0.00058*** 
 (2.91) (1.79) (0.82) (1.19) (2.20) (3.50) 
Year 0.00040 0.00082 0.00097* 0.00000080 -0.0000082 0.0000059 
 (0.80) (1.46) (1.78) (0.85) (1.10) (0.29) 
Constant -0.76 -1.49 -1.68 -0.0013 0.019 -0.0026 
 (0.77) (1.32) (1.53) (0.69) (1.25) (0.06) 
Observations 40 40 40 40 40 40 
R2 0.871 0.923 0.939 0.859 0.771 0.833 
Absolute t statistics in parentheses 
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01 
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A comment to the results 
The first part aimed at testing how sensibly the “new capitalism” would impact on 
inequality. The variables chosen to indicate the economic forces at work are: union density, the 
stock exchange market (a proxy for “financial exuberance”), globalization and money/credit 
market conditions. The signs of these variables – where significant – are the right and expected 
ones with few exceptions.  
As a general outlook, some results change when passing from an indicator of liquidity to 
an indicator of financial deregulation, which works better both in itself and in improving the 
overall quality of the fit. However, the role of union density is minor, the role of the stock 
exchange market becomes less clear, and the control variable for education loses its (high) 
significance. On the contrary, the globalization variable does not show changes.  
In both models union density has always the right sign: if the workers’ strength (union 
density) increases, inequality decreases. Unionized workers react better to attacks to their 
(monetary) rewards.  
In both models the degree of globalization impact positively on inequality. 
In both models the variables for the money and the credit markets do have effects, 
though they former has a less significant role (it influences P90/10 and all the top-shares only, 
whilst the latter impacts on all the four indexes and all the shares, with the unique exception of 
the bottom 1%). The variable for the financial de-regulation performs clearly better everywhere 
giving weight and significance to the idea that the credit market (a more complex concept than 
the simple liquidity concept represented by M2/GDP) has a sensible influence on inequality. All 
the variables for inequality react at the highest level of probability.  
The stock-exchange market indicator – the “financial exuberance” variable – increases 
exclusively the three top-shares in version (A), the one with the liquidity variable, while it 
increases the top 1% and top 5% only in version (B), the one with the financial de-regulation 
variable, where it increases also the bottom 10% and diminishes the P90/10, the P90/50, and 
the polarization index. The two interdeciles reflect the reaction of their numerator and 
denominator respectively: with a top-10% unaffected and a greater bottom-10%, P90/10 
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diminishes; since P90/50 diminishes as well, with a top-ten unaffected the “bottom” 50% must 
have increased. And this explains also why the polarization index F-W diminishes. Gini does not 
react significantly because of all these opposite movements.  
The Foster-Walfson index, which is a polarization index, specifically aims at evaluating the 
movements of the central part of the distribution: in other terms, it should reveal what 
happens to the middle-class. The phenomenon of the relative disappearance of the middle class 
has been stressed particularly by Milanovich, and in my opinion this is something of great 
relevance for the future of institutions. Be the evaluation of the middle-class positive or 
negative, its role is something that cannot be neglected. The impact of each variable on F-W is 
the same as on Gini, both in sign and significance, and only the R-squared is slightly smaller 
when using F-W, in both versions (A) and (B). Thus, in both versions, a decrease in the workers 
capability of negotiation and an exacerbation of the globalization increase polarization, i.e. have 
effect on the central part of the distribution, shrinking “the middle class”. A wider credit-market 
deregulation (only present in version B) does the same. The value of the stock exchange market 
influences the polarization index only in version B with a negative effect, because of the 
opposite influences on the two tails.  
7.2  Second stage: from inequality to democracy 
In this Section the description of the variables, the estimation procedure, and the Tables for the 
results – all related to the democracy context – are presented. This part hinges widely on Solt 
(2008), who is the only study, as far as we know, concerning advanced democratic (though with 
a different degree of democracy) economies. The differences between Solt’s article and this 
paper first lie in methodology (his is a cross-country analysis, mine is a time series analysis), 
then in the questions (only the second perfectly overlaps), in the source of data (many sources 
in Solt (2008), Eurobarometyer only in this paper) and in the time span (much longer here).    
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Dependent variable: (the quality of) DEMOCRACY 
↓ 
Variables for democracy 
Data for the “democracy” variable in the second step come from Eurobarometer, which is  a 
widely used survey on public opinion about many subjects (media, politics, environment, 
religion…), since 1973 until now. Three questions concerning “democracy” were selected and 
three models with these three different variables acting as dependent variables were 
estimated. 
1. Model 1. The dependent variable is:  
Satisfaction with democracy (“ON THE WHOLE, ARE YOU VERY SATISFIED, FAIRLY 
SATISFIED, NOT VERY SATISFIED OR NOT AT ALL SATISFIED WITH THE WAY DEMOCRACY 
WORKS IN COUNTRY?”) 
o            1  VERY SATISFIED 
o            2  FAIRLY SATISFIED 
o            3  NOT VERY SATISFIED 
o            4  NOT AT ALL SATISFIED 
This variable can be kept into its original form of an ordinal variable or can be transformed into 
a “dummy”. The first solution saves all the pieces of information but has to be treated with an 
“ordered” probit procedure, which adds a bit of complication. The second solution makes things 
easier but loses information, and this solution was chosen after having verified that results do 
not change in a significant way with the other one.  The time span is 1973-2007. 
2. Model 2. The dependent variable is:  
Political discussion (“WHEN YOU GET TOGETHER WITH FRIENDS, WOULD YOU SAY YOU 
DISCUSS POLITICAL MATTERS FREQUENTLY, OCCASIONALLY OR NEVER?”) 
o            1 FREQUENTLY 
o            2 OCCASIONALLY 
o            3 NEVER 
The same consideration as before applies here too. The time span here is 1973-2009. 
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Model 3. The dependent variable is:  
Vote intention: (“IF THERE WERE A GENERAL ELECTION TOMORROW, WHICH PARTY 
WOULD YOU SUPPORT?”) “. This variables tells that the person would not vote in the 
case of very soon elections.  
o         1   I WOULD NOT VOTE 
o  0   ANY DIFFERENT REPLY 
A sample of non-students aged more than 15 was selected and the influence of inequality and 
personal characteristics on three indicators of the quality of democracy as subjectively perceived by the 
population was estimated: i) being very satisfied with democracy, ii) discussing political matters 
frequently, iii) nonvoting if there were a general election tomorrow. N.B. Nonvoting is a measure of bad 
quality of democracy, which means that the direction (the sign) of coefficients of this variable is an 
inverse one.  The time span here is 1973-2004. 
Two different versions  of the three models were estimated, and a replication was then made 
for each inequality indicator as independent variables. 
A. The version (A) includes inequality [the Gini index and each other inequality indicator 
for the 9 replications], and control variables such as education (high- and medium-level vs. low-
level), age, gender (male vs. female), marital status (married vs. other marital status such as 
being single, divorced or widow). A variable year for the time trend, and a dummy variable as a 
correction for the different Gini index- source (FES vs.FRS) is added.  
B. The version (B) adds more control variables: the occupational status (self-employed or 
entrepreneur; manager; white collar; manual worker; retired from work; unemployed; each vs. 
the group of non-active people). 
 
Thus, in this second stage the dependent variable is (the quality of) DEMOCRACY, and the 
independent variables in both versions (A) and (B) are INEQUALITY and SOCIO-DEMOGRAPHIC 
CHARACTERISTICS.  
As far as the estimation procedure is concerned, the probit methodology has been used, 
i.e. a probit model is estimated using maximum likelihood.  
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Tables II present the results. In Tables II.1, II.2 and II.3 both the probit coefficients and 
the “marginal effects” are provided - together with the Gini index as the independent variable - 
in both versions (A) and (B) for the three democracy variables.  
The estimated probit coefficients cannot be read quantitatively as the partial effects of 
the independent variables on the dependent one, though their sign and the significance level – 
still expressed by the number of stars – can be read as in an OLS regression model. On the 
contrary, the “marginal effect” represents their readable version so that in the “marginal 
effect” column the coefficients can be read as the absolute change in the dependent variable 
that follows a one unit variation in the independent ones, given that all other variables do not 
change and are equal to their average value (and dummy variables at their mode value). For 
instance, in Table II.1 the reading of the marginal effect of Age in Model (A) is the following: if 
Age increases by 1, the probability to be satisfied by democracy increases by 0.0011; the 
probability for males (with respect to women) to be more satisfied by democracy is 0.025; well-
educated more than non-educated by a 0.022 and less-well educated more than non-educated 
by a 0.012. Since GINI index ranges from o to 1, the marginal effect -0.13 would be the effect 
whether Gini would move from 0 to 1: thus, if GINI would increase by 0.1, the probability to be 
satisfied with democracy would decrease by 0.013. Obviously, the same is told for the second 
model where employment conditions have been added to the first model. The coefficients for 
self-employed, managers, white collars, manual workers, retired from work and unemployed 
tell the different probability that these groups are satisfied by democracy with respect the 
control group: the non-actives. For instance, manual workers and unemployed are less satisfied 
with democracy than non-actives, and the difference in probability is, respectively, -0.011 and -
0.016.93 
                                                          
93 More precisely, the marginal effects tell how much the probability (between 0 and 1) that y=1 varies 
with regard to x. If the variable is a continuous variable the marginal effect tells how much the 
probability that y = 1 varies with the one unit variation of x. If the variable is a dummy (male, female) 
the marginal effect tells how much the probability that y = 1 if x=1 relatively to x=0 varies, all other 
things being constant.  
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Tables II.4, II.5, II.6, present the results obtained when each other inequality indicator is 
used, in both versions (A) and (B) for the three democracy variables. The results for these 
additional 54 models are presented with the “marginal effects” only and in a summary-way in 
order to check just for the divergences (if any). The Tables do not show, just for convenience, 
the effects of the control variables since their sign and significance level in both versions of 
each model are the same as in the models with the Gini.  
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Table II. 1  
Model 1 - Probit models on democracy satisfaction 
Versions (A) and (B) 
 (A)  (B)  
 Very satisfied 
with democracy 
Marginal effects 




of model (B) 
Gini -0.84** -0.13 -0.79* -0.12 
 (2.03)  (1.89)  
Age 0.0074***    0.0011      0.0066***      0.0010 
 (16.50)  (11.54)  
Male  0.16***  0.025 0.18***   0.027 
 (11.16)  (10.66)  
Married  0.0052     0.00079 -0.0033     -0.00050 
 (0.34)  (0.20)  
Education: university 0.13*** 0.022 0.089***   0.014 
 (5.47)  (3.37)  
Education: secondary  0.076*** 0.012 0.059***    0.0090 
 (4.30)  (3.26)  
Year  0.0049**    0.00075 0.0039*      0.00059 
 (2.28)  (1.72)  
Fes  0.032   0.0049 0.022   0.0033 
 (1.13)  (0.73)  
Self employed/entrepreneur   -0.0022  -0.00034 
   (0.06)  
Manager   0.042  0.0065 
   (1.24)  
White collar   0.00029      0.000044 
   (0.01)  
Manual worker   -0.074*** -0.011 
   (2.81)  
Retired from work   0.0042     0.00065 
   (0.15)  
Unemployed   -0.12*** -0.016 
   (3.12)  
Constant -11.4***  -9.33**  
 (2.71)  (2.10)  
Observations 62494  60715  
Pseudo R2 0.013  0.012  
Absolute t statistics in parentheses 
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01 
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Table II.2  
Model 2 - Probit models on political discussion 
Versions (A) and (B) 
 (A)  (B)  
 Frequent political 
discussions 
Marginal effects 




of model (B) 
Gini -0.61** -0.13 -0.68** -0.15 
 (2.01)  (2.24)  
Age 0.0062*** 0.0013 0.0062*** 0.0013 
 (19.84)  (15.19)  
Male  0.27*** 0.059 0.23*** 0.049 
 (25.93)  (19.39)  
Married  0.034*** 0.0073 0.026** 0.0055 
 (3.10)  (2.30)  
Education: University 0.53*** 0.14 0.44*** 0.11 
 (32.52)  (24.95)  
Education: high school 0.11*** 0.023 0.081*** 0.018 
 (8.37)  (6.15)  
Year  -0.0045*** -0.00098 -0.0057*** -0.0012 
 (2.99)  (3.67)  
Fes  0.028 0.0061 0.019 0.0040 
 (1.37)  (0.90)  
Self employed/entrepreneur   0.25*** 0.060 
   (10.26)  
Manager   0.26*** 0.064 
   (11.20)  
White collar   0.12*** 0.027 
   (6.27)  
Manual worker   0.031* 0.0068 
   (1.68)  
Retired from work   0.082*** 0.018 
   (3.94)  
Unemployed   0.082*** 0.018 
   (3.22)  
Constant 7.49**  9.91***  
 (2.55)  (3.26)  
Observations 95574  93648  
Pseudo R2 0.027  0.030  
Absolute t statistics in parentheses 
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01 
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Table II.3 
Model 3 - Probit models on the probability of not voting if there were a 
general election tomorrow                                               
Versions (A) and (B) 
 (A)  (B)  
 Would not vote if there 





Would not vote if 





Gini -3.40*** -0.45 -3.04*** -0.41 
 (6.93)  (6.27)  
Age -0.0089*** -0.0012 -0.0081*** -0.0011 
 (16.63)  (12.63)  
Male  -0.018 -0.0024 -0.00078 -0.00011 
 (1.12)  (0.04)  
Married  -0.17*** -0.024 -0.16*** -0.023 
 (10.15)  (9.25)  
Education: University -0.31*** -0.035 -0.25*** -0.30 
 (9.90)  (7.59)  
Education: high school -0.079*** -0.011 -0.069*** -0.0094 
 (4.04)  (3.43)  
Year  0.023*** 0.0031 0.017*** 0.0024 
 (9.99)  (6.82)  
Fes  0.0078 0.0010 -0.053* -0.0074 
 (0.27)  (1.76)  
Self employed/entrepreneur   -0.019 -0.0026 
   (0.51)  
Manager   -0.24*** -0.029 
   (5.79)  
White collar   -0.14*** -0.017 
   (4.83)  
Manual worker   -0.049* -0.0065 
   (1.85)  
Retired from work   -0.12*** -0.015 
   (3.60)  
Unemployed   0.074** 0.010 
   (2.11)  
Constant -46.2***  -34.4***  
 (10.19)  (6.93)  
Observations 54382  52477  
Pseudo R2 0.026  0.027  
Absolute t statistics in parentheses 
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01 
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Table II.4    
Model 1- Marginal effects and significance level of the inequality indicators in 
the probit model on democracy satisfaction 
Versions (A) and (B) 
 (A) (B) 
 Very satisfied with democracy 
Marginal Effects 
Very satisfied with democracy 
Marginal Effects 
Foster - Wolfson Index     -0.26***    -0.27*** 
P90/10       -0.015***     -0.015*** 
P90/50  -0.012 -0.012 
Share Top 1%     0.27**    0.30** 
Share Top 5%     0.0068  0.036 
Share Top 10%  -0.052 -0.029 
Share Bottom 1%       17.74***    18.47*** 
Share Bottom 5%       3.50***     3.44*** 
Share Bottom 10%       1.72***     1.71*** 




Model 2 - Marginal effects and significance level of the inequality indicators in 
the probit model on political discussion 
Versions (A) and (B) 
 (A) (B) 






Foster - Wolfson Index   -0.12* -0.16** 
P90/10      -0.0063**    -0.0075** 
P90/50  -0.0040 -0.0080 
Share Top 1%  -0.17 -0.15 
Share Top 5%   -0.19* -0.18 
Share Top 10%  -0.16  -0.17* 
Share Bottom 1%  2.48 2.48 
Share Bottom 5%  1.15 1.42 
Share Bottom 10%   0.90*    1.04** 




Model 3 - Marginal effects and significance level of the inequality indicators in 
the probit model on the probability of not voting if there were a general 
election tomorrow 
Versions (A) and (B) 
 (A) (B) 
 Would not vote if there 
were a general election 
tomorrow 
Marginal Effects 
Would not vote if there 
were a general election 
tomorrow  
Marginal Effects 
Foster - Wolfson Index -0.45*** -0.45*** 
P90/10 -0.016*** -0.011*** 
P90/50 -0.11*** -0.10*** 
Share Top 1% -0.62*** -0.54*** 
Share Top 5% -0.72*** -0.62*** 
Share Top 10% -0.67*** -0.58*** 
Share Bottom 1% 7.15 10.91* 
Share Bottom 5% 8.27*** 6.28*** 
Share Bottom 10% 3.39*** 2.53*** 
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01  
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A comment to the results 
As an overall evaluation, the Pseudo R2 – the “degree of the goodness” of the estimation – 
looks low but in models using micro-data it is absolutely normal that the R-squared is low, even 
very low.94  
Starting from Table II.1 (Model 1: satisfaction with democracy), the quality of the 
coefficients is fairly good both for their sign and for the statistical significance in both versions 
(A) and (B). Satisfaction with democracy decreases with increasing inequality and increases 
with age (ageing people become wiser, or more indulgent, or more tolerant); males are more 
satisfied with democracy than, respectively, women (do women and single have a greater sense 
of moral justice? Do they have more complaints against institutions that take care of them less 
than of others?); satisfaction increases with education (educated people vs. non-educated) and 
is greater for more educated people (education helps in evaluating democracy and its virtues?); 
the probability of being satisfied with democracy increases yearly by 0.00075; also employment 
condition plays a role on individual’s perception of democracy: unemployed and manual 
workers are less satisfied with democracy with respect to non-actives (as if less protected jobs 
would inoculate dissatisfaction against institutions), while self-employed, managers, white 
collars and retired have not a statistically significant different perception from non-actives. 
Table II.2 shows Model 2, which still has the same independent variables but changes the 
dependent one: political discussion is now taken as an indicator of the quality of democracy. 
Both versions (A) and (B) are provided. The conceptual setting keeps holding, and while all the 
variables of version (A) but the time-trend do not change both their sign and significance (on 
the contrary, the condition of being married becomes significant), all the added variables for 
the version (B) show a positive coefficient: having a job has a positive relation with the political 
                                                          
94 Pseudo R2 = 1-[log likelihood of the model/log likelihood of the model with the only constant]. Note: 
the log likelihood of a probit model is negative, and decreases in absolute value with the increase in 
the number of regressors. The higher the decrease of the log likelihood of the model with respect to 
the model with only the intercept, the closer to 0 is the ratio (log likelihood of the model /log 




discussion (does having a job let everybody feel part of a community? Does it suggest that 
political discussion might be useful in one’s own job-space? Does having a job just simply 
provide more occasions for political discussion?).    
Model 3 (in Table II.3) changes the dependent variable once more, being now the third 
“democracy” variable:  non-voting in a general election “tomorrow”. For all variables but Gini 
index the sign changes and it becomes negative. Since the variable is NON-voting, a negative 
sign means (still in probability) a direct effect: being male, married, having a high or medium 
level of education – with respect to control-groups – and ageing, increase the probability to 
vote. Worthwhile stressing that when inequality increases (the Gini index), still the choice is 
voting without any mediation: tomorrow. In my opinion this is a striking result, a strong 
confirmation of what political scientists call the “conflict theory” opposed to the ”relative 
power” theory. Whether the question is what would be the political reaction towards being 
distressed by political situation, institutions, and so on, the reply can be either an estrangement 
or a more active participation. Here the reply seems to be unequivocally participation through 
the most powerful and really incisive way: the vote. 
The probit models estimated on the three indicators of democracy suggest some general 
results. Looking first at the coefficient related to the Gini index, the finding is that a higher level 
of inequality significantly decreases democracy satisfaction and political discussion, while 
significantly increases the intention to vote. Moreover, being older, being male and having a 
high level of education have a positive and significant effect on the probability of being satisfied 
with democracy, of discussing frequently about politics and of voting if there were a general 
election tomorrow. Being married increases significantly the probability of frequent political 
discussion and of voting, while having no effect on democracy satisfaction. Also employment 
condition plays a role on individual’s perception of democracy: unemployed and manual 
workers are less satisfied with democracy with respect to inactive; self employed, manager, 
white collar, manual worker, retired people and unemployed are more likely than inactive to 
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discuss about politics. Employees of any type, self employed and retired people are more likely 
- while unemployed are less - to intend to vote than the inactive ones.  
When the other indicators of democracy are used the marginal effects are very similar 
and they tell us a similar story to the one told by the GINI even not in a perfectly uniform way.  
The Foster Wolfson polarization index, the P90/10 and, to a certain extent, the share of 
the bottom incomes95 suggest that higher inequality decreases democracy satisfaction and 
reduces political discussion though increasing vote intention.  
The regression coefficients of the P90-50, still negative, are not significant for the 
variables on democracy satisfaction and political discussion, while the P90-50 has a positive and 
significant effect on vote intention.  
The increase in the share of top incomes (1%, 5% and 10%) has a positive and significant 
effect on vote intention (do they want to sustain that political power which allowed them to 
increase their share? This might also help to explaining the above result for the P90/50…) while 
the effect (negative and significant though not in a uniform way) on political discussion is less 
clearly detectable.  
The effect of the share of top incomes on democracy satisfaction is significant only with 
regards to the share of top 1%. This effect is positive: an increase in the highest shares of 
income distribution increases democracy satisfaction. When the richest become more-richest, 
they are more satisfied by democracy and go to vote in order to maintain their privilege.  
Last but not least, the bottom-shares. In both models, a decrease in inequality (an 
increases in the bottom shares) increases the satisfaction with democracy very significantly, 
and increases the probability of non-voting (as if the voting option would exclusively mean a 
punishment), while the increase in the political discussion is a reaction of the bottom-1% only. 
This is the picture that emerges.  
 
                                                          
95 An increase in the bottom-shares decreases inequality 
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7.3 A third stage? 
A possible step forward would be to evaluate how much these three characteristics 
(satisfaction with democracy, discussion about politics, and decision not to-vote if there were a 
general election tomorrow) - that represent indicators of opinions and behaviors of the 
interviewee’s perception of the “quality of the democracy” - are reciprocally related. For the 
sake of simplicity the dummy variable “would not vote” has been re-coded into a dummy 
variable taking value 1 if the interviewed person “would vote” whether there were general 
elections tomorrow. Thus, the more likely he is satisfied with the democracy, the more likely he 
talks frequently about politics and the more likely he votes when elections take place, the 
higher the interviewee’s perception of the quality of the democracy, which, is our latent-
variable.  
The latent variable cannot be observed: it is simply reflected into the three indicators 
“satisfaction”, “discussion” and “vote”. Graphically, the factor-model can be represented as in 
Figure 1. The variable “quality of democracy” is drawn in a circle (unobservable) and affects the 
three observable variables in rectangles (observables). The arrows go from the latent to the 
observable variables, indicating the direction of causality. 
Figure 1 – A factor model for the quality of Democracy 
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Mathematically we can write the model as follows:  
11 __ udemocracyofqualitydiscussion    
22 __ udemocracyofqualityonsatisfacti    
33 __ udemocracyofqualityvote    
 The λ-coefficients are called factor-loadings and are calculated on the variance-
covariance matrix of the three variables, and the variance that the three indicators have in 
common should represent the latent factor, “quality of democracy” in our case.  
Unfortunately, the results of the factor-analysis model are poor: the three variables share 
very little variance, i.e., they have very little in common! (See Table III.1) 
Table III.1 – Correlation matrix of the democracy indicators 
  Satisfaction Discussion Would vote 
Satisfaction 1    
Discussion 0.02 1   
Would vote 0.043 0.039 1 
 
This fact is reflected into the estimated factor loadings (Table III.2). Usually, the minimum 
value that the estimated factor loadings can assume for the model to be considered acceptable 
is 0.40, much higher than the values we find. 
Table III.2 – Estimated Factor Loadings of the Factor Analysis 
  Factor Loadings 
Satisfaction 0.14 
Discussion 0.15 
Would vote 0.17 
           
Thus, the decision was not to proceed to extract the latent variable (in order to use it as a 
“normal” dependent variable in a model similar to the ones already estimated separately for 
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the three original indicators), and the present analysis stops here, leaving this problem to a 
further step.  
8. Concluding remarks 
In the 1980s, the United Kingdom has experienced a rising inequality more than any other 
European country. After a decade of relative stability (the 1990s), inequality re-started to 
increase during the 2000s, with an accentuation in the top part of the distribution revealing a 
“top-income problem” that reminds the American one. Though not reaching the US levels, UK 
appears however to follow a different path from other continental countries. This inequality 
sooner or later would probably impact on institutions: the democratic polity is expected to 
provide at least a relative well-fare to citizens, a decent life where being able to find a job in 
line with own skills and to provide the children with a (good) education is not considered a 
luxury.  
This paper attempts to test the effect of the “new” capitalism on inequality and the effect 
of inequality on democracy in the United Kingdom in the last thirty years.  
The results coming from the empirical tests all tell us that blowing the financial sector, 
deregulating the credit-market, dismantling unionization, tearing frontiers down, all has having 
a non-ambiguous effect on the rising of inequality, no matter how it is measured. Moreover, it 
appears that these same characteristics are having an impact on the middle class too, shrinking 
it. What this might mean for the future, let us leave to sociologists.  
Does inequality impact on democracy? As far as the measures for democracy used in this 
paper may credibly approximate its “quality”, the answer is YES. Satisfaction with democracy 
and political discussion decrease – and the let-us-go-and-vote option strengthens – with 
increasing inequality, again no matter how it is measured.  
Much work has to be done in both the theoretical modelling - in order to assess the 
relationship between market economy and inequality – and the empirical evaluation of 
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